Discrimination based on religion or belief, internal workplace regulations concerning religious symbols
Facts:
In 2003 the complainant, a Muslim, was employed as a receptionist. After three years she insisted that she should be allowed to wear a hijab at work. In response, the company management informed the complainant that the wearing of a headscarf would not be tolerated because the visible wearing of political, philosophical or religious signs was contrary to company’s position of neutrality. As a result of her insistence her employment contract was dissolved.
At issue was whether employer prohibiting all employees from wearing outward signs of political, philosophical and religious beliefs at the workplace is justified and it does not constitute direct discrimination under the Framework Directive.
Findings of court:
The court stated that the internal rule at issue regulates the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs and covers any manifestation of such beliefs without distinction. The rule must, therefore, be regarded as treating all employees in the same way. The court underlined that the internal rule prohibiting exposure of religious signs was not applied differently to the complainant as compared to any other employee. Therefore, the court ruled that this internal rule does not introduce a difference of treatment that is directly based on religion or belief, as laid down in the Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78.
The court stated also, that it is for the national court to assess whether this internal regulation may lead to indirect discrimination, unless it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
Implications:
The ruling must be regarded as an important step in interpretation of the scope of prohibition of religious discrimination at the workplace. It sets a standard of the employer’s rights to introduce internal rules on neutrality and justifies general prohibition of exposure of religious symbols. However, the court indicated, that such treatment might be always assessed from the point of view of prohibition of indirect discrimination.