Participatory and Procedural Rights in Environmental Matters

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Principles for Directives 2008/50/EC and 2002/49/EC
Principle of subsidiarity in Noise Directive

 

Directive 2002/49 requests the introduction to noise mapping and noise reduction action plans in particular in places where noise is generated by traffic (roads, railways, airports). Traffic is the subject of the common EU transport policy, and the emission limit values for vehicles, the establishment of a single EU railway area and the trans-European networks for - high-speed and freight - trains, furthermore EU-wide and even global nature of the air traffic business demonstrates that noise problems linked to the transport of persons and goods cannot be dissociated from EU transport policy. In other words: the subsidiarity principle does not require or even allow only regulating the free circulation of vehicles, trains and aircraft within the whole EU, but let the noise effects of this EU-wide transport be regulated at national level. Similar considerations apply to noise from industrial installations, outdoor equipment or other sources of noise.

Noise Directive 2002/49/EC did not fix limit values or other binding values. It only requested collection and dissemination of data, noise mapping and noise reduction action plans, leaving all details on the content of the plans to Member States. Under subsidiarity aspects, such a limitation would not have been necessary. It would have been possible to fix binding noise levels at EU level which were not to be exceeded during daytime and/or during nighttime at different hot points, for quiet areas, or more generally. In particular with regard to airport noise, common minimum EU standards, especially for night flight restrictions, would make sense as airports in EU are in heavy competition with each other; also common provisions for railway freight transport and for high-speed trains would make sense in a single EU railway area. Problems of noise levels changing during time could be overcome by average values and other technical provisions. The decision not to fix EU quality limit values at all was thus a political decision which was not required by the subsidiarity principle.