



Preventing Radicalisation in Detention

Vienna, 12-13 October 2017



Speakers

Dr Mohamed Ajouaou, Chairman of Islamic Spiritual Care Services, Custodial Institutions Agency, Ministry of Security and Justice, The Hague

Koen D'Haenens, Head of Extremism Department, Belgian Prison Service, Brussels

Ramin Farinpour, Senior Lawyer, Course Director, European Criminal Law Section, ERA, Trier

Carys Keane, National Specialist Lead for Extremist Offending, Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service, London

Dr Hans Kieserling, Head of Unit, Section for Correctional Services, Hessen Ministry of Justice, Wiesbaden

Gerry McNally, President, Confederation of European Probation (CEP); Assistant Director, The Probation Service, Dublin

Philipp Meißner, Prison Reform Focal Point, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Vienna

Nicola Piacente, Chief Prosecutor, Coordinator of Financial Crimes and Counter-Terrorism Unit, Prosecution Office, Como

Sir John Saunders, Vice-Chairman of the Parole Board for England and Wales, former High Court Judge, London

Katharina Schwarzl, Commissioner, Department for Enforcement and Prison Supervision, Federal Ministry of Justice, Vienna

Iliana Taneva, Secretary to the Council for Penological Cooperation, Council of Europe, Strasbourg

Yola Wanders, Director of Terrorist Wing, Vught Prison, Custodial Institutions Agency, Ministry of Security and Justice, Vught

Dr Ryan J Williams, Affiliated Research Associate, Prisons' Research Centre, University of Cambridge

Håkan Zandén, Probation Director, VO Halland/Västra Götaland, Swedish Prison and Probation Service, Gothenburg

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Languages
English, German
(with simultaneous interpretation)

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317DT47

Organiser
ERA (Ramin Farinpour) in cooperation with the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice, the European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services (EuroPris) and the Confederation of European Probation (CEP)

Preventing Radicalisation in Detention

Thursday, 12 October 2017

8:30 Arrival and registration of participants

9:00 **Welcome and introduction**
Ramin Farinpour

I. SETTING THE SCENE: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN STANDARDS IN RELATION TO DEALING WITH RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN PRISONS AND AN OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TAKEN

Chair: Ramin Farinpour

09:10 **Global UN standards and the UNODC Handbooks on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence and on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence**
Philipp Meißner

09:45 **The Council of Europe's Guidelines and Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism**
Iliana Taneva

10:15 **Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons within the EU**
Ryan Williams

10:45 Discussion

11:15 Coffee Break

II. JUDICIAL CHALLENGES IN RELATION TO PREVENTING RADICALISATION IN PRISONS WITHIN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF THE RELEVANT FRAMEWORK DECISIONS

Chair: Ramin Farinpour

11:45 **The application and impact of Framework Decisions 829, 909, 947 and the EAW on the (de-)radicalisation of inmates: an overview**
Gerry McNally

12:15 **The role of the judiciary in disengagement, rehabilitation and de-radicalisation: perspectives from a judge**
John Saunders

12:45 Discussion

13:00 Lunch

14:00 **The judicial perspective on risk assessment and dealing with radicalisation in prisons: Italy's approach of using anti-mafia techniques within a broader radicalisation setting**
Nicola Piacente

14:30 Discussion

III. DEALING WITH RADICALISATION IN PRISONS

Chair: Gerry McNally

14:45 **A look inside a prison: a case study from the Netherlands in how to deal with (potentially) radicalised offenders in a specialised wing – Vught and De Schie prisons**
Yola Wanders

15:15 Discussion

15:30 Coffee break

Objective

This second seminar in a series of four co-funded by the European Commission on issues related to countering terrorism and radicalisation will focus on preventing radicalisation in prisons. The use of the relevant Framework Decisions and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in relation to the radicalisation and de-radicalisation process will be analysed, along with the judiciary's role in this area.

Key topics

- Framework Decisions 2008/829 (European Supervision Order), 909 (transfer of prisoners) and 947 (probation and alternative sanctions), their implementation and proper use in relation to the (de-)radicalisation process
- The EAW and pre-trial detention in relation to apprehending and (de-)radicalising individuals
- The role of the judiciary in disengagement and de-radicalisation
- De-radicalisation programmes in prisons and religious counselling

Who should attend?

Judges, prosecutors, lawyers in private practice, ministry officials and officials from judicial training institutions, prison administrations, the probation services and prison monitoring bodies.

Venue

Federal Ministry of Justice
(Palais Trautson)
Museumstraße 7
Vienna

Your contact persons



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- 16:00 **The need for a coherent approach in relation to policy, infrastructure, staff training and risk assessment (Vera 2, OCAM, Celex) when dealing with radicalised offenders**
Koen D'Haenens
- 16:30 **Main issues and challenges in relation to the need for multi-agency cooperation when dealing with radicalised offenders: examples from Sweden**
Håkan Zandén
- 17:00 **Risk assessment and de-radicalisation measures in Austria: the building of a multidisciplinary network to counteract the growing phenomenon**
Katharina Schwarzl
- 17:30 Discussion
- 18:00 End of first seminar day
- 19:30 Dinner

Friday, 13 October 2017

- 09:00 **Provisions for extremist offenders and those of concern: research and case studies from the UK in relation to the radicalisation process, assessment procedures and intervention programmes**
Carys Keane
- 09:30 Discussion

IV. RELIGIOUS COUNSELLING AS A MEANS OF DERADICALISATION IN PRISONS

Chair: Ramin Farinpour

- 09:45 **Europris' general basic rules on prison chaplaincy and de-radicalisation; the German and Catalan multi-faith chaplaincy approaches to deradicalisation**
Hans Kieserling, Julio Zino
- 10:30 **How Islamic religious services can contribute to preventing and countering religious radicalisation in prisons: the Dutch model and case studies**
Mohamed Ajouaou
- 11:00 Discussion
- 11:30 Coffee break
- 12:00 **Simultaneous workshops:**
- **European initiatives and good practice in countering radicalisation in prisons**
Koen D'Haenens, Yola Wanders, Ryan Williams
 - **The role and challenges for criminal justice practitioners when dealing with radicalised individuals within the context of the relevant Framework Decisions and EAW**
Gerry McNally, John Saunders
 - **Religious care and interagency cooperation**
Hans Kieserling, Katharina Schwarzl, Julio Zino
- 13:00 **Workshop reports** and participant discussion
- 13:30 End of seminar and lunch

For programme updates: www.era.int
Programme may be subject to amendment.

CPD

ERA's programmes meet the standard requirements for recognition as Continuing Professional Development (CPD). This event corresponds to **11 CPD hours**.

Save the date

Annual Forum on Combating Corruption in the EU 2017

Trier, 21-22 September 2017

Annual Conference on EU Border Management 2017

Trier, 28-29 September 2017

Annual Conference on EU Criminal Justice 2017

Trier, 23-24 October 2017

The 4th and Upcoming 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directives

Trier, 16-17 November 2017

Annual Conference on Countering Terrorism 2017

Trier, 23-24 November 2017

Countering Migrant Smuggling

Trier, 30 November – 1 December 2017

Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights on Detention

Strasbourg, 7 – 8 December 2017

e-Learning

Introduction to European Criminal Justice

Cornelia Riehle, Nadine Thwaites

The Case Law of the CJEU for Criminal Law Practitioners: 10 Key Questions

Anne Weyembergh, Advocate General
Yves Bot, Chloé Brière, Corina Badea

The European Arrest Warrant: 10 Key Questions for Defence Counsel

Holger Matt, Vânia Costa Ramos, Jodie Blackstock

www.era.int/elearning



PREVENTING RADICALISATION IN DETENTION

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Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020



Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

Council of Europe Guidelines and Handbook for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism

Iliana Taneva, Secretary to the Council for Penological Co-operation (PC-CP)

Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe





Council of Europe Action Plan for fighting violent extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism

two objectives: (a) to reinforce the legal framework against terrorism and violent extremism; (b) to prevent and fight violent radicalisation through concrete measures in the public sector, in particular in schools and prisons, and on the Internet

CODEXTER to adopt soon a Counter Terrorism Strategy for the years 2018–2022



The Guidelines and the Handbook

- The Guidelines were adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 March 2016. The Handbook was approved by the CM 22 March 2017
- Both provide guidance for the member states to devise appropriate policies to be implemented by their prison and probation services in conformity with the Council of Europe standards and principles related to the rule of law and human rights protection



Definitions contained in the Guidelines – no definition of terrorism

- **Radicalisation** – dynamic personal process of acceptance of VE
- **Violent extremism (VE)** - promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism
- **Dynamic security** – a concept and a working method by which staff prioritise the creation and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners based on professional ethics



Basic principles - Guidelines

- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
- Respect for data protection and privacy
- Imprisonment as a measure of last resort
- Good prison management



Council of Europe Handbook

- VE and radicalised offenders have no one single profile, no size fits all
- Identification - motivations, needs, grievances, attitudes, personal history, vulnerability
- Screening, assessment, classification
- Not necessarily a need to invest in new programmes and methods - use resources better
- Staff has a very important role - staffing issues come first, frontline staff



Managing of rehabilitation of VE

- Interventions - focus, approaches, goals
- Disengagement, deradicalisation, desistence
- Information sharing and communication
- Multi-agency co-operation
- Specific groups



November 2016, Strasbourg, Round table of prison and probation staff designated to deal with VE

- Allowed to promote the Guidelines and the Handbook
- Allowed to create networks, to exchange information, experience, good practices and lessons learned
- The summary of the discussions together with the Guidelines and the Handbook will soon be published in English and French



Thank you for your attention!

For more information:

www.coe.int/prison



RAN P&P Practitioners' working paper

Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation

Introduction

This paper aims to provide policy-makers, prison governors and prison and probation staff with information on current practice and issues relevant to managing Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) and individuals considered at risk of engaging in violent extremism in a prison and probation context ⁽¹⁾. The paper is structured around these two contexts. While in practice this distinction may not exist in some EU Member States, it serves to identify key issues: prison conditions and reintegration strategies, risk assessment, prison regime choices, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives, and staff training.

Product of the RAN Centre of Excellence and the RAN P&P Working Group. Authored by Ryan J. Williams, Research Associate, University of Cambridge, Centre of Islamic Studies and Prisons Research Centre.

⁽¹⁾ The working paper develops a previous working paper under a different title. Radicalization Awareness Network, 'Dealing with Radicalisation in a Prison and Probation Context Ran P&P - Practitioners Working Paper' (2015).



This paper also aims to provide guidance and to help support decision-making processes, both at policy, and at prison and probation management levels. It is therefore written for accessibility rather than comprehensiveness. A one-size-fits-all solution does not exist because EU Member States vary in many ways, including in legislation and how prison and probation systems are organised ⁽²⁾. However, multi-agency cooperation is crucial in the management of risks related to radicalisation and to ensure that VEOs are provided with opportunities for rehabilitation.

Since the launch of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012, the Working Group on Prison and Probation (RAN P&P) has focused on preventing violent extremism, engagement with extremist groups and extremist behaviour during detention and probation. This paper is based on practitioners' input and up-to-date research on the subject, although research in this area remains limited due to the relatively small size of the population concerned. The RAN P&P Working Group comprises 250 practitioners, including representatives from probation services, prison governors, prison officers, Ministries of Justice and intelligence services, and NGOs and civil society organisations working with offenders. RAN P&P has convened 13 meetings with practitioners from all EU Member States (including three study-visits to prisons in three different countries) and leading researchers, enabling high-quality exchanges on a range of themes ⁽³⁾. These meetings have highlighted a range of promising practices in prison and probation contexts, which can be consulted the RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices ⁽⁴⁾.

Practitioners and policy-makers face enormous political and public pressure to ensure public safety. Regardless of these pressures, RAN P&P maintains the following guiding principles that are reflected throughout this paper:

- the safety of society is best ensured through promoting the well-being and rehabilitation of offenders;
- terrorism crimes cover a range of activities; individuals sentenced for terrorist acts do not all represent the same risk to society;
- offenders are capable of positive change and they need support to disengage from violent extremism;
- universal human rights must be upheld at all times and under all circumstances;
- promoting positive staff-prisoner relationships and healthy prison climates is a pre-condition for reducing risk around radicalisation and contributing to rehabilitation and reintegration;
- multi-agency cooperation is crucial to prevent radicalisation and support desistance processes.

This working paper concerns those convicted or on remand for terrorist-related offences and those considered to be at risk of radicalisation in prison and probation contexts.

⁽²⁾ United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons," (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2016). Global Counterterrorism Forum, "Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders," (Rome2012).

⁽³⁾ Summary papers of these events are available online.

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/index_en.htm



It has become incumbent (and sometimes a legal requirement) upon Member States to prevent acts of terrorism within public institutions such as prisons and individuals at risk of radicalisation fall within this remit. In this report, we emphasise that these types of offenders are diverse and include individuals who have not committed acts of violence and who may never do so. Being radical does not mean that a person will in any way follow up with violent action. Any response to radicalisation needs to recognise this diversity. We also recognise that effective management of Violent VEOs and those considered at risk of radicalisation requires multi-agency cooperation. It is crucial that offenders receive continuous support and that information flows between organisations, including prison and probation services, police, and community organisations.

Did you know?

Violent extremist offenders - a special case? EU Member States currently have a range of opinions and approaches to VEOs and issues around radicalisation. Some normalise the risks associated with VEOs (e.g. Italy, through its rehabilitation approach which is not tailored to VEOs) and radicalisation, while others treat these risks as requiring special structures and/or processes (e.g. the United Kingdom Healthy Identity programme, targeting VEOs specifically) ⁽⁵⁾.

- *General Approaches:* There is overlap between theories of desistance from crime and desistance from terrorism; it is important to provide for vocational and social support as required, alongside specialist approaches⁽⁶⁾.
- *Specialist Approaches:* Offenders' individual circumstances may lead them to require unique approaches. For example, individuals who have committed violence with ideological motives, have experienced trauma after fighting in a foreign conflict or developed specialised combat skills, or have network ties with extremist groups, may require specialist interventions and processes. These specialist approaches may include unique psychology- and/or religion-based interventions.

Context

The context of terrorism has changed dramatically for prisons and probation. 'Foreign terrorist fighters' ⁽⁷⁾ now account for the highest proportion of arrests and convictions in Europe (Table 1). The number of arrests has tripled over the last three years, putting increased strain on prisons and probation as offenders

⁽⁵⁾ United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons."

⁽⁶⁾ Adam Calverley, *Cultures of Desistance: Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Ethnic Minorities* (Taylor & Francis, 2012); Stephen Farrall, *Understanding Desistance from Crime: Emerging Theoretical Directions in Resettlement and Rehabilitation*, ed. Adam Calverley (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006).

⁽⁷⁾'Foreign terrorist fighters' are defined by the UN Security Council (resolution 2178) as '...nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State [other than their own territory or state]... for the purpose of perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training in connection with armed conflict'. This includes individuals leaving Europe and travelling to Syria, Iraq, Mali or Ukraine.



move through criminal justice systems. According to Europol, Jihadist terrorism and foreign fighters represent the largest proportion of arrests in the EU over the past three years (Table 1) ⁽⁸⁾.

Other types of terrorism, including ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, plus left-wing and anarchist terrorism, are on the decline. Concerns over right-wing extremism have however grown as polarising and nativist social and political discourse fuel acts of violence against Muslims and migrants by reactionary movements, individuals and small groups. These tensions are expected to continue increasing for the foreseeable future. This complex social and political climate is reflected in prisons, and adds to the diverse populations and tensions that require managing.

A range of activities are now considered terrorism offences, many of which are non-violent and therefore represent a limited risk to society. 'Lesser risks' include those associated with fundraising, intention to travel, or possession of material considered extremist. The characteristics of those committing the offences have also changed; the population is younger, more diverse, and includes more women. Practitioners report that the radicalisation process can be remarkably short, as little as two weeks, and that recruitment can occur in prison⁽⁹⁾.

Did you know?

Special terminology? Agreeing on terminology is helpful for describing specific processes and interventions. Particularly in multi-agency settings, a shared language can help different parties understand each other and cooperate. The extent to which this language is also used when working with the offenders themselves should be considered carefully.

- 'Disengagement' refers to behavioural change, such as leaving a group or changing one's role within it.
- 'De-radicalisation' refers to a cognitive shift in understanding and outlook that moves individuals away from legitimising violence ⁽¹⁰⁾.
- In some instances, using (the term) 'de-radicalisation' may lead to inappropriate labelling and stigmatisation, which can be harmful.

With some VEOs receiving short sentences, criminal justice systems have a limited window in which to affect the process of change. Because these periods for intervention are brief, continuity as an individual moves from prison to the community is crucial, and should involve multi-agency cooperation as needs are

⁽⁸⁾ Europol, 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat)', (The Hague: European Union, 2016). p.18.

⁽⁹⁾ Research, however, has not documented a single recruitment process. United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons', p. 114. For a discussion of the complexities around radicalisation in prison, see Alison Liebling, Helen Arnold, and Christina Straub, 'An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at Hmp Whitemoor: 12 Years On', (Cambridge: Cambridge Institute of Criminology, Prisons research centre, 2011); Alison Liebling and Helen Arnold, 'Social Relationships between Prisoners in a Maximum Security Prison Violence Faith and the Declining Nature of Trust', *Journal of Criminal Justice* 40 (2012).

⁽¹⁰⁾ See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-exit/docs/ran_exit-ex_post_paper_london_15-16032016_en.pdf online.



assessed and support provided. Family support mechanisms and partnering with third sector NGO's should be explored. Probation services will play an important role in designing these alternatives to rehabilitation in prison settings. The numbers of foreign fighters expected to come into contact with the judicial system also raises questions over interventions pre-trial and during the trial itself ⁽¹¹⁾. Member States are currently exploring ways of preventing 'detention damage', and in some cases are making available alternative sanctioning options for less serious offences.

Table 1.

Year	2013	2014	2015
No. individual arrests in the EU for terrorism-related offences	537	774	1077
No. individuals arrested for jihadist terrorism	216	395	687
No. convictions for terrorist offences	258	345	417
No. acquittals for terrorist offences	78	107	110

Source: Europol ⁽¹²⁾

The challenge posed by VEOs and radicalisation is uneven among EU Member States, but it is clear that the number of VEOs is rising rapidly across the EU as a whole, with 258 convictions for terrorist offences in 2013 and 417 in 2015 (Table 1). France (424), Spain (187), the UK (134), and Belgium (61) reported the highest number of arrests in 2015.

Monitoring procedures are currently in place in many EU Member States (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK) to manage risks associated with offenders who are not convicted of terrorist-related crimes but who are at risk of committing violent extremist acts or influencing others to do so. Data on the numbers of individuals being monitored over concerns linked to violent extremism are not always reported by Member States, and are subject to frequent fluctuation. The figures that are available show that in the England and Wales, 600 individuals are being monitored while in Italy, 124 individuals in prison are being monitored. These monitoring procedures, while prudent, raise legal, resource, and ethical issues: how can risk be monitored appropriately without stigmatising individuals as 'extremist' and contributing to further alienation?

Did you know?

Reducing risk through support: prisons and probation have a duty of care towards individuals in custody, including care for the vulnerable. Those convicted of extremist offences, and those seen to be at risk of radicalisation need support at crucial times. Managing VEOs and persons suspected of becoming radicalised towards violence or influencing others towards a violent extremist mindset should not over-emphasise risk at the cost of meeting individuals' needs and providing support.

⁽¹¹⁾ Global CounterTerrorism Forum, 'Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization' (2015).

⁽¹²⁾ Europol, 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat) '; 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat) ', (The Hague: European Union, 2014); 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat) '; 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (Te-Sat) '.

Key recommendations

- 'Terrorist offences' and the individuals who commit them are growing in range and do not all present the same risks to society. Responses should be proportionate; otherwise there is a risk of 'detention damage' among individuals, of fuelling the radicalisation process through disproportionate measures.
- All EU Member States have general rehabilitation programmes targeting different types of offenders. Whether VEOs should have access to specialised programmes should be explored. Decisions should be based on individual risks and needs, the policy perspective on dealing with VEOs, the proportionality of designing specialised programmes versus the size of the target group, and the potential risks of stigmatisation doing more harm than good.
- Multi-agency cooperation is necessary to ensure informed decision making about interventions (through information sharing) and to ensure intervention continuity from prison to the community. It should include representatives from at least the prison, probation, police, community organisations, social and health services and the family.

Prison context

Healthy prison environments

Research suggests that radicalisation in a prison environment is rare but that prison conditions can play a significant role in heightening or lessening risks⁽¹³⁾. Recent terrorist attacks across Europe have been committed by individuals with a criminal past⁽¹⁴⁾. The prison environment includes the physical environment and values, relationships, procedures and policies that constitute the day-to-day functioning of a prison. These factors shape the prison experience and can provide opportunities to reduce both the risk of radicalisation during imprisonment and the risk of reoffending after release into society. Overcrowding, a lack of staff or poor relationships between staff and prisoners, and poor facilities — including poor access to meaningful activities such as education and work — can have a negative impact on prisoners. Underpinning 'dynamic security'⁽¹⁵⁾ is a holistic approach to a healthy prison environment that includes the following dimensions⁽¹⁶⁾:

Staff-prisoner relationships: Prisoners must be treated with dignity, respect and courtesy at all times. Good relationships involve care for the vulnerable as well as help and assistance. Effective staff-prisoner relationships contribute significantly to the safety and security of staff, prisoners and the public by smoothing the flow of information and improving its quality. Good relationships between VEOs and staff can facilitate the building of trust and help break down 'us' versus 'them' barriers and the distrust and suspicion towards 'the authorities' often seen amongst people with an extremist mind-set. Therefore

⁽¹³⁾ Mark S. Hamm, *The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat* (New York: New York University Press, 2013).

⁽¹⁴⁾ Simon Cottee, "Reborn into Terrorism: Why Are So Many Isis Recruits Ex-Cons and Converts," *The Atlantic*, 25 January 2016.

⁽¹⁵⁾ See https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_Handbook_on_Dynamic_Security_and_Prison_Intelligence.pdf online.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Alison Liebling, *Prisons and Their Moral Performance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).



investing in effective day-to-day interaction between staff and prisoners is a key element of dealing with VEOs.

Well-being and personal development: Offenders' well-being and development must form the core of rehabilitation in prison. Ensuring this involves meeting basic needs (access to decent food, clean sanitary facilities, time outside) and providing vocational training so that prisoners may pursue personal development. Access to education, creative endeavours such as art and music, and a space for practicing and developing a religious faith are all important avenues for encouraging personal development and minimising distress.

Conditions and family contact: Prison conditions encompass facilities to maintain personal hygiene and decency, a clean living space, and access to and respect for cultural and religious considerations through processes and facilities. For instance, body searches and searches conducted by dogs must be performed in a way that respects cultural and religious norms. Family contact is a crucial form of support for prisoners and contributes to healthy relationships after release. Frequency of contact with family, a meaningful space for visits that includes comfortable spaces for children, and an appropriate time allocated for meaningful contact are all important for family contact. Family bonds are important for the reintegration of VEOs as they can be (although not in all cases) a positive driving force for rehabilitation.

Security, safety and control: An organised, controlled and efficient prison provides prisoners with a structure that meets expectations and allows them to feel safe. A lack of structure and inconsistencies in security and control can negatively impact prisoners' experiences, and safety needs may be met through other means, including groups (e.g. religious groups, gang-like groups) that offer protection. These groups can enhance and entrench prisoner hierarchies (sources of status) and conflicts between groups of prisoners, heighten risks in prisons and decrease perceptions of safety. Understaffing or inexperienced personnel have a negative impact on security and control.

Did you know?

Placing trust appropriately encourages a safe and nurturing staff-prisoner culture: intelligently placed trust is crucial for security and control, fostering good relations between staff and prisoners. It is also crucial for the rehabilitation of prisoners. Not trusting individuals can damage their self-esteem and can have a negative impact on offenders' capacity to see themselves as trustworthy and to reintegrate into society. A well-run prison must be grounded in intelligent trust: trusting prisoners who are trustworthy and allowing opportunities for those considered untrustworthy to build trust. Heavy-handed or punitive policies, as well as poor staff-prisoner relationships, can erode trust, contribute to alienation, legitimise extremist views against the state, undermine efforts to rehabilitate and jeopardise safety.

Professionalism: Professional staff apply rules and distribute privileges fairly and equally. They also communicate prison rules and expectations clearly. Professional discretion should be exercised to ensure that punitive practices are enforced only when other options have been exhausted. Staff should communicate clearly with prisoners so that they understand why certain disciplinary actions are being taken towards them and are aware of what behaviour they need to change. Professionalism involves equal treatment of VEOs and other offenders. Professionalism might be tested by offenders. VEOs with a strong ideological inclination and trust issues towards authorities may test staff by explicitly 'dehumanizing' them (e.g. calling them dogs) and targeting their personal views and opinions. Prison staff need to be trained and



offered supported to help them recognise this behaviour and to understand how to respond to it professionally.

Did you know?

Professionalism requires fairness (legitimacy): fairness involves just processes and just outcomes. Just processes imply quality decision-making procedures and fairness in the way people are personally treated by prison and probation staff. Just outcomes imply that individual groups are treated equally and fairly. Favouring or disadvantaging one group can decrease the legitimacy of the prison. Singling out one group, such as Muslim offenders or terrorist offenders, can reinforce an 'us' versus 'them' divide (e.g. 'the state is against Muslims') and erode the legitimacy of the prison and the state, reinforcing extremist ideology.

It is important to consider that different ethnic and religious groups have different experiences (e.g. in relation to discrimination, marginalisation, Islamophobia, or racism) and that that recognising equality and diversity avoids reinforcing these experiences and causing harm. Research has shown how unhealthy prison environments can create the conditions that contribute to radicalisation and can more broadly contribute to negative outcomes for all offenders⁽¹⁷⁾, including the heightened levels of distress that lead to suicide⁽¹⁸⁾.

Did you know?

'Difficult' prisoners and the prison environment: problematic prisoner behaviour can be linked to the prison environment. Unfair treatment, poorly organised regimes, or frustrations around contact with family are all circumstances that may influence a prisoner's behaviour. Research has shown that difficult prisoners may be difficult in some environments but not in others⁽¹⁹⁾, suggesting that challenging behaviour – including behaviour related to radicalisation – must be considered alongside in relation to the prison regime.

Key recommendations

- A healthy prison environment is the primary deterrent for radicalisation. The risks of radicalisation are reduced through a professional, secure and fair prison. The absence of these elements can reinforce the extremist mind-set and distrust towards authorities, and increase both the formation of groups and triggers for violence.
- Investing in day-to-day staff-offender relationships, through staff empowerment, professionalism, respect and dynamic security measures, is key to dealing with VEOs.

⁽¹⁷⁾ Hamm, *The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat*.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Alison Liebling, *Suicides in Prison* (London: Routledge, 2002).

⁽¹⁹⁾ Roy D. King and Kathleen McDermott, "'My Geranium Is Subversive': Some Notes on the Management of Trouble in Prisons," *The British Journal of Sociology* 41, no. 4 (1990).



Risk assessment and support

EU Member States are currently inconsistent in how they use the results of intelligence and risk assessment, and how they collect information. Approaches range from professional judgement to formal risk assessment tools.

Risk evaluation and assessment currently take two forms:

- information gathering, monitoring and analysis;
- specific risk assessment tools used for VEOs and those suspected of being radicalised or influencing others.

Member States are encouraged to follow the guiding principles outlined on page 1.

Did you know?

What is subversive behaviour? in an effort to prevent violent extremist acts, more attention has been given to identifying non-violent extremist behaviours that may be a precursor to violence either inside or outside of prison. This has raised significant issues for staff who are tasked with identifying behaviours of concern. Spotting risks related to radicalisation is also difficult in a prison environment. The line between 'prison behaviour' (resistance, power struggles, or joining a group for protection) and 'extremist behaviour' (committing violent acts), is often blurred. Structured individual assessments and trained staff can help assess risks, motivation, and prisoner needs more accurately.

Procedures are currently in place in several Member States (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom) to detect radicalisation. These procedures include intelligence gathering and reporting⁽²⁰⁾. Intelligence is crucial to the safe functioning of prisons, but monitoring for extremism is subject to false positives. We therefore recommend four sets of considerations to assist decision-making linked to intelligence:

- (1) if intelligence is used to inform decision-making, including placement of prisoners in special units, it must be used in accordance with legal frameworks and human rights;
- (2) the intelligence systems around the 'target group' must be multi-levelled: they must recognise degrees or levels of risk or threat (e.g. in relation to capability, intent and engagement) and must specify whether this threat relates to the offender him/herself, prison officers, other prisoners, or the public;
- (3) intelligence must be used in a dynamic way, allowing for individuals to have their risk lowered and for intelligence to be dismissed if invalid or out of date;
- (4) intelligence must be contextualised: individuals who prompt concerns and security intelligence around radicalisation must have this information contextualised and embedded within other sources of information. This contextualised understanding should include:
 - accounts from persons with personal or close knowledge of the offender that can provide context and understanding of him/her, for example, a chaplain or a prison officer;
 - actuarial data: about the individual and the offence;

⁽²⁰⁾ Global CounterTerrorism Forum, 'VPrison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization'.

- dynamic factors: such as employment, housing, mental health, family support, etc.; changes in these factors in particular may trigger increased risk, or mitigating circumstances that reduce risk;
- clinical factors: professional judgement and experience, using personal and professional experience to assess the information collected through interviews and file reading;
- information from partners in a multi-agency framework, such as from social workers, the police, and intelligence services, about an individual.

Some Member States (e.g. Sweden) have a dedicated prison intelligence organisation. An often-heard complaint from prison directors is the lack of sharing between prisons and intelligence services. Having a dedicated prison intelligence organisation can allow for information sharing protocols that make it easier for general intelligence services to inform prisons about offenders who might have started a process of radicalisation.

Did you know?

Radicalisation and religious behaviour: for religiously inspired extremism, it is very important not to confuse people who might have (re)discovered their faith with people who have developed radical views. Most people who convert or revert, e.g. to Islam, during imprisonment are doing so for peaceful individual motives or to bond with a group of other prisoners. Prejudices around links between religion and extremism remain very present and may hamper accurate risk assessment. Staff diversity and awareness training helps to avoid confusion between the two.

Several formal risk assessment tools are currently used in a number of Member States to assess the risk believed to be associated with people suspected or convicted of violent extremism⁽²¹⁾. Risk assessment for radicalisation, however, is currently in its infancy. An accurate assessment must consider the range of motivations and circumstances that contribute to radicalisation, which will differ between offenders and may include existential needs for belonging, ideological commitments, financial incentive, or glorification of violence⁽²²⁾. As they have a focus on violent extremism, these risk assessments are designed to be implemented next to general risk assessments and other instruments used to assess the overall risks and needs of offenders.

Assessments are limited in value if they are not carried out frequently. They must be treated as a continuous activity aligned with professional judgements. Risk assessment tools can be used for a variety of reasons, including assessing the needs of the offender and informing appropriate placement, programmes and support.

⁽²¹⁾ These include the Vera 2 instrument, the REM (Risk Assessment Extremism for Managing), and the ERG22+ (Extremism Risk Guidance). See D. Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, 'Violent Extremist Risk Assessment: Issues and Applications of the Vera-2 in High-Security Correctional Setting', in *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2014). RAN P&P Visit Penitentiary Institute, Vught 26 November 2015. Monica Lloyd and Chris Dean, 'The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders', *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management* 2, no. 1 (2015).

⁽²²⁾ United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons', p. 42.

Did you know?

Radicalising influences: determining whether someone is attempting to influence another person into adopting violent extremist behaviours is a major challenge within today's context of concerns. Influencing others assumes intention to coerce someone into violence and assumes that someone is willing to adopt a violent position and behaviour. Risk management practices must be mindful to separate risks from individuals coercing others to adopt extremist attitudes from other forms of social interactions. Peer groups in prisons may provide opportunities for prosocial mentorship. Risk management practice must also be mindful of vulnerable individuals who may be subject to bullying and coercion.

Risk assessment tools should not be used as predictive tools to gauge an individual's future threat or behaviour. The use of these tools could have several harmful effects, including labelling individuals as 'extremists', contributing to alienation, and potentially decreasing the legitimacy (fairness) of the prison⁽²³⁾. This is why it is crucial to thoroughly and repeatedly assess each individual, paying attention to their personal, social and environmental circumstances⁽²⁴⁾. An emphasis on risk assessment and detection should not come at the expense of supporting offenders by providing for safety, personal development, or opportunities for family contact.

In order to recognise positive and negative change, it is important that assessments are repeated at regular intervals or at times of change. This is crucial for documenting and understanding reductions in risk level that a particular offender may show as his/her disengagement process evolves, and for decision-making transparency with regard to, for example, programmes and placement.

Did you know?

Charismatic Leadership: the level of social prestige enjoyed by prisoners can be determined by a range of factors. Research has shown that prisoner status arises from what is imported into the prison (crime hierarchies) and what is considered valuable within a prison context for lessening the pains associated with imprisonment (e.g. social bonds). Leadership among prisoners must be understood within the wider social, material, and moral climates of prisons. Recent research found evidence of prisoner hierarchies emerging in a tense prison environment with poor staff-prisoner relationships, and of the leader bringing balance, stability and order to the wing⁽²⁵⁾.

⁽²³⁾ Alison Liebling and Ryan J. Williams, 'The New Subversive Geranium: Some Notes on the Management of Additional Troubles in Maximum Security Prisons', *British Journal of Sociology* (in press).

⁽²⁴⁾ United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons', p. 42.

⁽²⁵⁾ Alison Liebling et al., 'Locating Trust in a Climate of Fear: Religion, Moral Status, Prisoner Leadership, and Risk in Maximum Security Prisons — Key Findings from an Innovative Study', (Prisons Research Centre, Institute of Criminology: University of Cambridge, 2015).

Key recommendations

- Monitoring and intelligence sharing tools for radicalisation and recruitment are needed to assess the risk and threat level of VEOs (to themselves, other offenders, staff and the public); organising this within the prison system may enhance cooperation with police and general intelligence services;
- Specialized risk assessment tools are needed for violent extremists; information should be collected from multiple sources and care must be taken to reduce assessor bias;
- Specialised risk assessment tools should complement other risk and needs assessment tools and approaches;
- Risk assessments must be completed regularly so that changes to risk levels are clear; the assessments must take account of the personal, social and environmental circumstances of the offender;
- Risk assessment protocols need to be appropriate for the complexity / size of the process / population, resource level and staff capabilities within a Member State;
- With regard to rehabilitation, risk assessment should include an assessment of needs — both general as well as those specific to dealing with an extremist mind-set (e.g. more contact with family, development of religious understanding, more contact with other prisoners or staff members who can positively influence the VEO).


Prison regime choices: concentration, dispersal or a combination

EU Member States currently use one of three regime types to manage VEOs and individuals considered either at risk of radicalisation or of influencing others ⁽²⁶⁾. Not all VEOs are located in high-security prisons (some do not have high Security prisons), and some Member States have dedicated prisons for VEOs charged with or convicted of terrorist crimes (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain). Policy and practice are shifting rapidly in this area, with countries exploring different regime choices (England and Wales, for instance, are considering moving from a dispersal model to a special unit, while France experimented with special units in 2016). This section explores differences between prison regimes following the concentration, dispersal or combination models, and the challenges and benefits of each. Figure 1 details part of the decision-making process involved in these regime choices.

Containment Model: VEOs and people suspected of radicalisation are placed in separate units — sometimes these smaller units follow a similar regime, sometimes they have unique regimes that help staff manage specific risks and behaviours (see considerations for special units). Containment models may 'concentrate' VEOs and suspects together or they may serve as special units for different types of individuals with problematic behaviour (that is, not just VEOs). The containment model is, initially, an opportunity for VEOs entering the prison system, but it is also an option for individuals not convicted for VE offences if their behaviour is linked to radicalisation (see 'entrance criteria', p.13).

⁽²⁶⁾ Roy D. King and Sandra L. Resodihardjo, 'To Max or Not to Max', *Punishment & Society* 12, no. 1 (2010).

Figure 1. Decision-making flow chart for three models of imprisoning VEOs and radicalised offenders



Did you know?

'Entrance criteria' for special units: the criteria must be met to enter special units. The criteria should consider: the basis on which decisions are made on moving an individual to a special unit; the exact criteria used; the ways in which problematic behaviours associated with radicalisation are similar to or different from other problematic behaviours found in a prison environment; the transparency of decisions; whether they are subject to legal challenge; and whether the decisions align with human rights.

Advantages: containment allows the close monitoring of behaviours and interactions. Through training, staff can become highly specialised in working with this population and interventions can be focused on their needs. VEOs are separated from the mainstream population and this avoids shifts in the power hierarchy and the exertion of any influence from VEOs on violent extremism. The containment model also ensures that VEOs and those considered at risk of radicalising others do not directly recruit or influence others in the mainstream population. In addition, to the public it is a very 'visible' way in which to deal with VEOs.



Disadvantages: placing VEOs together may strengthen social bonds and contribute to a culture of opposition between prisoners and staff, undermining staff efforts to build relationships and trust. These social dynamics may further entrench an oppositional mindset between 'us' and 'them' and reinforce views that the state is against individuals. Grouping by similar religious or ethnic group may also reinforce views held inside prison and within society more generally about the unfair treatment of particular religious or ethnic groups, legitimising grievances. The units could be a source of stigma and status (see 'special units' below), subverting their aims by damaging offenders' self-image or making the units desirable placements; in both cases, undermining rehabilitation efforts. The approach treats all extremist offenders as equal in degree and severity of risk, despite a range of activities included under the heading of 'VE offences', including those related to fundraising, travel, and violence. The cost of purpose-built facilities and regimes are high, and there is little research to determine how well such units are working. (Early) experiences of special units, for example in the Netherlands and France, show the difficulty of finding good staff. When incidents occur (e.g. staff are wounded), positions in special wings become much less attractive. As the range of terrorist offences is growing, so is the diversity of risk and needs of offenders (male / female, different offences, different ideological backgrounds) within the special wing. Upholding a single security regime that works despite these differences has proved difficult.

Did you know?

The challenge of 'special units': locating VEOs and persons considered at risk of radicalising others in special units raises issues around stigmatisation and status. Special units risk entrenching risk-labels assigned to these individuals, hindering rehabilitation opportunities. They can also contribute to group bonding among prisoners and undermine rehabilitation efforts. Special units can serve as a source of status, as being sent to a special unit marks a prisoner off as distinct from other prisoners and could be seen as a marker of prestige. The case for using special units rather than the existing processes and structures for managing problematic behaviour must be clearly articulated in each context.

Dispersal Model: VEOs and people suspected of radicalisation are placed among the mainstream prison population and fall under the same general regime. Under this approach, there is an effort to normalise VEOs within the mainstream population — although security regimes may differ for these offenders. Problematic behaviour among VEOs and mainstream prisoners whose behaviour relates to radicalisation can be managed through existing procedures. Problematic prisoners may warrant special placement in line with prison procedures.

Advantages: as prisoners are placed among mainstream populations, they are not subject to the same sources of stigma or marginalisation that follow from placement on a special unit. Similarly, the issues around the status derived from being placed on a special unit do not arise. There may be opportunities for VEOs to change their attitudes and behaviour through interactions with the mainstream prisoner population. The financial costs of this approach are likely to be lower compared to special units.

Disadvantages: no specialized staff are employed, and General staff may not be trained to fully understand either the population or markers of risk. Risks around extremism are more difficult to identify among mainstream prisoners as these risks are part of a host of other social dynamics and risks to order and control. There are also concerns that dispersing VEOs throughout the general population will heighten the potential for radicalisation among others, and will provide opportunities for crime cultures to intermix.

Did you know?

‘Exit criteria’ from special units: there should be clear criteria for moving people out of special units. Key considerations include: If special units are used for problematic prisoners and VEOs, what considerations are given for offenders to move out of these units? Is an ‘exit criteria’ specified, or are special units used for the duration of offenders’ sentences? Opportunities should be provided for prisoners to modify their behaviour and to have these changes recognised.

Combination Model: People suspected or convicted for violent extremist acts are placed either in a separate or ordinary regime, depending on risk assessment and the behaviour of the individual prisoner.

Advantages: A combination model provides flexibility and adaptability to the risks and needs of individuals.

Disadvantages: The criteria and risk assessment tools for determining appropriate placement are imprecise (see Risk assessment and support). A combination model is costly as staff training and specialist resources are needed.

Table 2. Summary of Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of Regime Choice

Regime choice	Potential Advantages	Potential Disadvantages
Containment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Close monitoring -Limited effect on mainstream population -Focused interventions -Specialised staff -Reassuring to public safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -New and stronger bonds forged among prisoners -Eroded trust between staff and prisoners -Entrenched oppositional mindset - Perceptions of unfairness reinforced -Labelling effects, stigmatisation -Status associated with being on a special unit -All VEOs assumed to be of equal risk -Difficulties finding staff -High financial cost
Dispersal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Less stigmatisation and marginalisation -No status derived from placement on special unit -Opportunities for positive influence from others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Generalist staff, training costs -Difficult to ensure high quality of intelligence -Challenges in knowing prisoners and dynamic security -VEOs may exert influence over others -VEOs may be influenced by criminal gangs
Combination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Tailor-made response to individual needs/risks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Selection criteria /risk assessment is imprecise

Key recommendations

- Prison regime choices should be guided by the aim to normalise VEOs whilst minimising the risks to the VEOs themselves, other prisoners, staff and the general public.
- The pros and cons of different models of prison regime available for managing the risks around radicalisation must be carefully considered and weighed against the individual needs of offenders. For prisoners demonstrating concerning behaviour linked to radicalisation, special units may be necessary but their use must be guided by clear entrance and exit criteria, and they must operate within the legal frameworks of the country concerned.
- Differentiation within special units is important for tailoring security and rehabilitation efforts to different levels of risks and needs in relation to the level of the offence, gender and ideological background.
- Regardless of regime choice, prisons must be equipped with a means of assessing the most appropriate placement for prisoners, and have suitable staff training provisions (generalist or specialist).



Rehabilitation interventions

Using existing structures and processes for individualized sentence plans: There are few rehabilitation interventions in place in prisons specifically for VEOs and those suspected of radicalisation. Issues around radicalisation are usually addressed through existing structures and processes, and these are individualised for each offender as part of his or her sentence plan ⁽²⁷⁾. Behaviour is addressed through psychological interventions, chaplaincy activities, education and employment, and good relationships between staff and prisoners. Taking a broad and holistic approach recognises that desistance from VE is a multifaceted and often unique journey. Vocational training whilst in prison is significant in preparing offenders for release and desistance. Offenders with shorter sentences present fewer opportunities for intervention in prison.

Specialist psychological interventions: There are only few examples of specialist interventions targeting VEOs directly ⁽²⁸⁾. Those that do exist are psychologically driven and are conducted one-on-one or in small group settings. The need for specialist interventions depends on the particularities of each individual. Experience suggests that individual interventions might be harder to finance. During group interventions, participants are often less 'honest', especially regarding their own situation and views. The potential disruption of group dynamics (e.g. charismatic radical 'leaders' who challenge the facilitator) must also be taken into account.

Theological education and pastoral support: Chaplaincy provisions can help with religious education and support. Chaplains not only provide religious education, but in the case of violent Islamist ideology, can also challenge particular views and provide opportunities for detainees to think about issues in a different way. However, opportunities for participating in chaplaincy activities vary across EU Member States according to resources, the demographics of each prison, and the State's position on religion. Specialist theological interventions, including dialogue sessions, as found in Muslim majority states, are rare among EU Member States. Care and guidance at times overlap with deradicalisation and preventive aims, for example when providing alternative theological perspectives, but security should not be a chaplain's primary focus. If chaplains are involved in disengagement / deradicalisation efforts, they should be experienced and trained to do so. The fact that they are religiously educated does not suffice for specialist interventions with VEOs.

⁽²⁷⁾ United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons', p. 42.

⁽²⁸⁾ Christopher Dean, 'The Healthy Identity Intervention: The UK's Development of a Psychologically Informed Intervention to Address Extremist Offending', in *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2014).

Did you know?

Religion in prison and the State ⁽²⁹⁾: the existence of chaplaincy departments for VEOs and individuals potentially concerned by radicalisation differs across EU Member States. France, for instance, does not formally recognise Muslim chaplains as part of the prison system, whereas in England and Wales chaplains are formally employed by the State and are increasingly involved in risk assessment ⁽³⁰⁾, although this has not been without controversy as it can erode the trust of prisoners ⁽³¹⁾. It is important that chaplains are respected by prisoners and that their role is clearly separate from security so that they can maintain prisoners' trust and provide both pastoral and spiritual care, and guidance.

Social Support: Providing opportunities for offenders to maintain close ties with networks of family and friends is crucial to bridging the transition from prison to release. Research on desistance among criminals in general, and among VEOs specifically in relation to deradicalisation and dis-engagement, supports the importance of social ties in these processes. Interventions such as mentor projects can also be used to provide social support and help build trust-based relationships, for example with staff, community members and NGO professionals. It is important to assess whether the family and social circle are partners in a disengagement process and as opposed to stimulators of the extremist mindset. If the latter is true, social support should be provided through other channels (in line with legal and human rights regulations).

Key recommendations

- Rehabilitation interventions should be supported by both risk and needs assessments, while sentence plans for VEOs must include tailor-made intervention plans. These can be based on existing structures if in place, but may also include specialist interventions.
- Psychological interventions can take place in a one-to-one or group setting. Although more expensive, one-on-one interventions should take priority over group interventions because of the potential negative impact on group dynamics in the latter.
- Providing religious and spiritual support is key and may have a disengaging effect on VEOs with religiously motivated ideologies. However, if chaplains are intentionally involved in disengagement / deradicalisation efforts, they should be experienced and trained in this area. Their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the offender and wider community should be considered.
- Social support is important for disengagement and for eventual release. Working with family and friends as partners in a disengagement process is effective if the social circle was not a factor in the radicalisation process in the first place. Other avenues of social support (e.g. mentor programmes or community involvement) must also be considered.

⁽²⁹⁾ Ryan J. Williams and Alison Liebling, 'Faith Provision, Institutional Power and Meaning among Muslim Prisoners in Two English High Security Prisons', in *Religion in Prison*, ed. Kent Kerley (Praeger, in press).

⁽³⁰⁾ James Beckford, Daniele Joy, and Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Muslims in Prison: Challenges and Change in Britain and France* (Basingstoke, England & New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).

⁽³¹⁾ Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Stephen Pattison, and Mansur Ali, *Understanding Muslim Chaplaincy* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013).



Staff training and support

As European society in general has become more diverse and complex, so too have prisoner societies. Sensitivity and understanding of cultural and religious norms, values and expressions has become increasingly important for good staff-offender relationships. It is not necessary for all staff members to be experts on specific ideologies or religions. It is, however, necessary that correctional officers have some background knowledge of the religious and cultural backgrounds of the people they are working with. Prejudice, uncertainty and fear of offenders can lead to over-reporting and negative interactions with prisoners and can contribute to marginalisation and create an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust.

General training: A certain level of staff professionalism is necessary if training on the specific topic of radicalisation is to be effective. More specialised training of all frontline prison and probation staff should include understanding the circumstances that can lead to violent extremism (see Risk assessment and support, page 9). All frontline prison and probation staff should be trained to recognise processes of radicalisation. We emphasise that this approach should not look for 'signs' of radicalisation, as these are frequently subject to false positives and misunderstanding. Rather, what is needed is knowledge of the individual offender and an understanding the role of unsafe prison environments (see 'healthy prison environments', p.6), including a lack of support resources and avenues for the pursuit of personal development and hope. Staff must be mindful of hostility between staff and prisoners, as well as among prisoners, and must pursue their work with VEOs and others at risk of radicalisation whilst exercising respect, fairness and empathy.

Specialist Training: Staff working directly with convicted terrorists need a specific skill set and not all staff members will be suitable. Training will typically cover a range of professional practices, including: understanding pathways to violent extremism, recognising radicalization warning signs and features of positive regimes, carrying out intelligence assessment, following ethical standards, interpersonal skills, stress management, and religious and cultural diversity ⁽³²⁾.

Specialist staff can usually be divided into two categories: regular officers who work on a specialised wing or unit (e.g. a terrorist wing) and those who collate information from other experts (these can be social workers, psychologists, etc.). These specialist staff will carry out assessments and manage interventions/programmes. Support is needed for these specialist staff, who are often engaged in a struggle for the 'moral high ground' and need to build trust with offenders.

A sensible approach would be to offer general-awareness training to all staff, and specialist training to staff working directly with incarcerated terrorists. Staff members should be supported in managing their anxiety and being confident about their decisions, both those based on results from the assessment tool and on their professional insights. A support structure should be put in place involving colleagues, psychologists and prison management. A training and support unit at the national level should be established to update and disseminate training course material and offer support to staff and governors. A national-level training

⁽³²⁾ United Nations, 'Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons', p. 30.



and support unit should also connect with other Member States to share best practice models and training materials.

Key recommendations

- Staff training must include the topic of diversity to improve understanding prisoners of different cultural and religious backgrounds as so to enable staff to understand which behaviours and practices are potentially linked to radicalisation, and which are not.
- Staff should be trained to understand radicalisation and as well as individual, social and environmental reasons for prisoners' behaviour. Looking for 'signs' of radicalisation should be done within the broader context of recognising prisoners' vulnerable points and needs for support. Staff need to understand the process and not just look for 'signs'.
- Generalist training should be made available for all, and specialist training is needed for different staff roles and in proportion to the prisoner population considered at risk.
- A national training and support unit for prison staff can help with the dissemination of training material, development of better training practices, and levels of psychological support offered to staff. It can also strengthen cooperation at local, national and international levels and facilitate the sharing of best practices and training material.

Probation context

Services responsible for offenders in post-release contexts bear an increasing burden as they seek to manage risks related to violent extremism while ensuring that offenders are supported and reintegrated post-release. With the definition of terrorist-related offences having broadened while sentences have become shorter (less than four years, with some serving as little as two weeks), there may be very little opportunity to rehabilitate offenders in prison. The diversity of offenders, who include youngsters and an increasing number of women convicted for terrorism-related offences, requires consideration and unique approaches. In this new context, multi-agency cooperation is necessary between prisons, probation (or equivalent), police and community service providers to ensure that information is shared and that offenders and ex-offenders are provided with the necessary interventions and support structures. Multi-agency cooperation and planning for release must begin well in advance of the release date, preferably at least six months earlier, to ensure that information exchange is enabled and continuous, and that support services are in place.

Releasing and reintegrating VEOs: general good practice

Reintegration aims to prevent violent behaviour and enable inclusion and participation in society. A sense of belonging and acceptance makes commitment to violence less sustainable. Radical ideas are not dangerous in themselves, even though they may remain a risk factor for violent behaviour in some circumstances. There is limited research on VEOs post-release, and little is known about what helps resettlement. However, as a matter of good practice:

Resettlement plans: Plans should be included in the working agenda for the offender as early in the sentence as possible. Risks and needs assessments are a key tool to design effective reintegration programmes. Probation services (or national equivalent) should cooperate on this assessment during the



final stage of the prison sentence. Such multi-agency cooperation can provide guidance on how best to shape the reintegration process.

Transition management: Transitional periods are those points in time when the risk of recidivism is high, and when it is important to have plans in place prior to full sentence being served. These plans should incorporate ways to deal with a problematic home or personal life, and make use of human and social capital in order to reduce the likelihood of new offences.

Individualized risk and needs assessments: Understanding the individual and responding to their unique circumstances and challenges is important, as is facilitating the desistance and / or deradicalisation process by recognising a potential to contribute to society. Multi-disciplinary teams are recommended to evaluate offenders' individual needs and risks.

Capacity building: Planning for the end of support and building capacity for an individual to rely on others and to cope, including social and organisational support (see below), is critical.

Trust: Trust is central to effective probation work, and often the process of matching extremist offenders with probation officers is carried out with the building of trust in mind. Probation officers who share a cultural or religious background with the offender may help to foster trust.

Social and organisational support — co-producing desistance with others: Theories of desistance — those that seek to understand how individuals cease or desist from crime — suggest that desistance is co-produced with others. These 'others' would include correctional officers and additional persons in social networks. Representatives of other collaborating organisations, including community organisations that help with job-seeking or religious or spiritual guidance, and social services, should serve to meet social support needs and decrease sources of risk. Friends, family members and other significant others and meaningful relationships are crucial for desistance trajectories and for reinforcing a positive view of non-violent behaviour as well as a positive identity. People who are assumed to have some authority over the offender, such as religious leaders, teachers, or people who formerly held the same beliefs and attitudes but have desisted from violent behaviour and could now serve as mentors, may also be a positive influence.

Did you know?

Promoting human good: the 'Good Lives Models' (GLM) is a strengths-based and positive approach to desistance and rehabilitation. It recognises that reducing criminological needs is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for effective interventions. The GLM takes a constructive and broader account of human good — 'experiences, activities, states of affairs that are strongly associated with the well-being and higher levels of personal satisfaction and social function' ⁽³³⁾. This broader account of the person that includes their hopes, goals and sense of purpose, is crucial to facilitating desistance processes for offenders convicted of terrorism-related offences.

Positive relationships are crucial to supporting desistance and / or de-radicalisation processes and these should be facilitated through relationships. The aim of these relationships should be to:

⁽³³⁾ Tony Ward and Shadd Maruna, *Rehabilitation* (Taylor & Francis, 2007). p. 21.

- provide support as any criminogenic needs (those needs that directly relate to the likelihood of someone committing a crime, e.g. lack of certain skills) are identified through appropriate assessment tools;
- offer support as the problems that offenders themselves define as central to their situation and as potential reasons for violent behaviour;
- help offenders recognise and realise their potential strengths, capabilities, skills etc. and channel them appropriately;
- offer suggestions and opportunities for participating in the community, such as through cultural or sports groups;
- support the offender in realistically defining a 'good life' and finding ways of practically attaining that vision;
- stimulate a redefinition of an offender's identity through positive feedback that supports hope, belonging and reintegration.

Key recommendations

- Offenders must have continuity of support from prison to release, especially in view of the shorter sentences that terrorist-related crimes now incur, and because it is the transition periods that pose the highest risk for recidivism.
- Multi-agency cooperation is crucial to ensuring a fluid transition from prison to the community and to maximising opportunities for offenders to have their needs accurately assessed and met. This cooperation should be part of post-release planning and involve a multi-disciplinary team.

(Specialist) Interventions

Interventions, support structures and risk management practices may be specially designed for VEOs or they may be more generalist in approach, for example, by ensuring vocational opportunities and facilitating family support⁽³⁴⁾. Whether a specialist approach is taken will depend on the needs of the offender. Some Member States (e.g. France, the Netherlands, UK) have voluntary programmes, making a range of possible interventions possible:

- **Offenders must have continuity of support** from prison to release. The first few weeks for offenders after release are the point at which ex-offenders are most vulnerable. Adjustment can be difficult for both ex-offenders and his or her family. One way to ensure this continuity is to provide a mentoring or facilitator arrangement with offenders pre- and post-release. He or she should work with the individual throughout the sentence and should remain a point of contact and support after release.
- **Providing for the material and social support needs of VEOs:** Structured cooperation with service-providers like housing agencies, employment agencies, educational institutions, health care providers and family services are crucial to providing ex-offenders with opportunities for reintegration and rebuilding lives post-release. This must be built into resettlement plans prior to release, along with any social needs. Building and supporting relationships, developing positive social bonding,

⁽³⁴⁾ Radicalisation Awareness Network, 'Ex Post Paper Ran Exit' ed. RAN P&P (Amsterdam2016).

supporting and stimulating personal strengths and skills, encouraging hope, and offering guidance in religious and spiritual matters are also important for reintegration into society and for an offence-free lifestyle. The exact forms of support will depend on the internal and external needs of the offender. Because of the stigma attached to terrorist offences, providing this kind of support might prove more difficult for VEOs (see 'Barriers to reintegration', p.23).

- **Interventions in cooperation with the offender's social network.** Desistance research has shown the importance of strong social ties in the encouraging offenders to adopt a crime-free lifestyle. Involving an ex-offender's social network, especially the family⁽³⁵⁾ in interventions provides crucial support for desistance processes. This may include involving family members in professionals' decision-making about the ex-offender, giving them tasks or responsibilities to help the ex-offender, and providing training that prepares them to deal with their loved one when the intervention stops. Those within an offender's social network who are a negative influence should not be involved, but care should be taken when identifying such negative influences. Promising practices in this area may be inspired by the 'social net of benefits' approach used with juvenile offenders on remand or close to release, who have their networks of significant others organised around them in support. Everyone signs a contract that is agreed upon by the offender. The binding contract places responsibility with the offender's network and this serves as a social safety net. Austria is experimenting with this.
- **Theological interventions and support from religious communities.** Such specialist interventions may be offered in prison and post-release. Religious communities, including volunteers and imams, play an important role in supporting offenders post-release, while a lack of social and spiritual support can increase vulnerability post-release. Offenders may benefit from general religious counselling or from tailored religious and theological interventions. Specialist interventions may be underpinned by either a theological approach where the aim is to counter specific ideological beliefs, or may take a cognitive-behavioural approach. Practitioners should seek to use these community resources as part of a network of support that is available to aid the ex-offender in his or her desistance and reintegration journey. As with mentoring schemes and working with family members, appropriate risk assessments should be carried out for individuals involved.
- **Mentoring programmes.** Some EU Member States (Denmark, UK) have a mentoring system in place for radicalised individuals who want to leave violent extremism⁽³⁶⁾. These mentors, who serve as role models and guides within society, can be trained volunteers. Some might be 'formers', with a past as a violent extremist and experience of leaving the scene⁽³⁷⁾. They are familiar with the situation in which the person finds him or herself, can offer guidance on pathways out of extremism and showcase alternative lifestyles. Other mentors may come from religious or community organisations and may support the offender in any number of ways, including day-to-day help (e.g. in completing job applications). Vetting mentors to make sure there are no hidden agendas and having a good matching process between mentor and offender are key to success.
- **Mental health services.** Increasingly, data and experience support some sort of connection between radicalised offenders (and radicalised individuals in general) and mental health issues.

⁽³⁵⁾ Basia Spalek, 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation in Relation to Families: Key Challenges for Research, Policy and Practice', *Security Journal* 29, no. 1 (2016).

⁽³⁶⁾ Basia Spalek and Lynn Davies, 'Mentoring in Relation to Violent Extremism: A Study of Role, Purpose, and Outcomes', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35, no. 5 (2012).

⁽³⁷⁾ Global Counterterrorism Forum, 'Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders'.



Mental health services and assessments are needed in prison and post-release to ensure that the individual receives the support needed.

Key recommendations

- A range of specialist and generalist approaches should be available for supporting VEOs post-release, such as material and social support schemes, family and friends support initiatives, religious counselling, dialogue sessions, mentoring programmes and cooperation with mental health services.
- Initiatives should cater to the individual needs of the offender and include attention to material, economic, social, spiritual and religious needs.

Barriers to reintegration

Research has long recognised that an offender faces significant difficulties in becoming a 'requalified citizen' once released from prison, and that these difficulties take many forms, including economic, relational and emotional. Individuals convicted of terrorist offences face additional barriers. There are unique sources of stigma associated with terrorist offences, and in some contexts this negative label may be appropriated and serve as a badge of status in marginalised communities.

Stigmatisation: The stigmatised offender will experience challenges in terms of accessing social support and opportunities to reintegrate, including access to employment or education. At all points, professionals working with VEOs must recognise their potential to become reintegrated into society, and must provide support as they seek to achieve this goal. Upholding prejudices towards the offender can entrench barriers and reinforce oppositional and radicalised identities.

Trust: It is crucial that professionals work towards building and maintaining trust with the ex-offender and with wider segments of the public. Distrust of communities or community organisations can reinforce perceptions of unfairness among community members. Member States' probation services (or equivalent) can benefit from building strong relationships of trust with community organisations. This ensures that multiple sectors of society maximise the opportunities for offenders post-release.

Release conditions: Conditions can be quite strict for these offenders, and go beyond those set for other types of offenders. This may hamper reintegration if, for example, offenders are easily recalled to prison for their breach. Practitioners however may also use these conditions, and the more frequent contact they imply, as an opportunity to work with offenders and respond to their needs.

Staff Training

Probation work with VEOs has a marked effect on probation workers above and beyond ordinary probation work. The social and political climate in relation to extremism heightens stress levels for those working with offenders, while policies can change quickly and may be guided by political considerations rather than what is known to be best for the offender. There is a low risk acceptance with VEOs, meaning that the consequences of making mistakes with this group will be heavily scrutinized by political leadership and the general public. This can restrict the professional judgement of probation officers. The officers can find their work under intensive political scrutiny, and balancing social and political pressures with what may be best for the offender's needs for reintegration represents a fine balance. This is not expected to change for the foreseeable future.



Specialised training is needed for probation workers to accurately assess the needs of offenders (see 'staff training and support', p.18). Ideology may or may not be the main driver for the offender, and specialist training and experience is needed to understand and assess when ideology should be taken into account, and when other ways of addressing offender behaviour should be explored. Probation workers are also in need of support through debriefings, stress management training, and through co-worker and management support.

Key recommendations

- Offenders convicted of terrorism-related offences face unique challenges in re-entry into the community because of stricter conditions, stigmatisation and trust issues. These must be planned for prior to release and addressed alongside material needs (employment, education, housing);
- Staff face extraordinary pressure in working with this category of offender and require access to training and support in order to perform their role effectively.

Working paper conclusions

The challenges ahead for prison and probation practitioners working with VEOs are both growing and shifting. As increasing numbers of individuals are being held in prison for terrorism-related offences, there is a growing need to respond appropriately to the risks and needs of these offenders and to prepare them for release into society.

Further challenges stem from a shifting political context and insecurity from terrorism threats, so it will be of critical importance to understand and maintain best practices. Member States will need to allocate limited resources in a way that contributes to general improvements in the overall prison climate as well as more specialist interventions for monitoring and managing risks and contributing to rehabilitation and resettlement of VEOs. These decisions will be informed by the number of individuals presenting a risk and the type of radicalisation under consideration (including religious inspired, far right, left wing, or separatist).

Practitioners across Member States are growing in confidence and competence in this area. There is recognition that investing in high-quality day-to-day interactions between staff and prisoners — dynamic security — is a positive step towards minimising the risks of radicalisation. There is also a move towards normalising VEOs, although not all countries are faced with the same degree of risk, and some are unable to normalise some VEOs due to the risks that they present to the prisoner population and/or the public. Specialised risk assessments and interventions are now being piloted and used in a dynamic way to evaluate the needs and risks of offenders. The best practices in this area are individualised and responsive to the needs of the offender.

Further precision is however needed. Practices are constantly changing across EU Member States which has made identifying countries using particular practices very difficult. The reasoning behind decisions that lead to particular policies and practices being adopted needs to be more transparent and fed into a broader knowledge base of best practices.



Moreover, the evidence base remains thin. Decision-making is rarely evidence-based. Research needs to be embedded into practice early on. A research foundation is needed to understand the contexts in which radicalisation seems to flourish (and where its risks are diminished), and what helps offenders to reintegrate into society. Risk assessments must be subject to robust empirical evaluation and compared with other types of risk management practices to determine what methods and approaches are most effective. Staff training also needs to be evaluated, with attention paid to whether it improves staff-prisoner relationships alongside the ability to manage risks related to radicalisation. Information on evidence-based practices could be facilitated in the future through research partnerships.

For 2017 the RAN P&P Working Group will have to prioritise these many challenges and address them through the knowledge and experience of prison and probation practitioners. The focus for the year will be on:

- Dealing with increasing numbers of VEOs, especially returnees. What are the implications of this for regime choices and intervention programmes? The growing numbers also mean there will be more experience and practice to share, which will make it possible to sharpen the recommendations presented in this paper.
- The role of probation, also in light of shorter sentences and alternative sentencing.
- The role of religion in day-to-day work with VEOs, but also in specialised exit programmes.

This paper will be updated at the end of 2017 to include new insights from research and practice.



Annex

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Framework Decisions 947, 829 and 909 from a Probation perspective

*“The (Potential) Application and Impact of FD 947, 829 and 909 in cases
of radicalised offenders”*

12th October 2017, Vienna

Gerry McNally
President, CEP

Confederation of European Probation



Is the largest European Network Organization for Probation
Founded in 1981

Mission:

To promote the rehabilitation and social inclusion of offenders through sanctions and measures implemented in the community.

Objectives:

- 1) To **unite probation organisations** all over Europe
- 2) To **professionalize** the sector of probation in Europe
- 3) To **raise the profile** of probation in the global arena of criminal justice systems

CEP Membership - 2017



60 EU Member organizations

34 Countries
38 jurisdictions

9 Universities

16 Individual members

7 Affiliate members

More than
370
Online documents

1700
CEP
Newsletter subscribers




1100
Twitter
followers



1000
LinkedIn
followers



Many Europes (reddit)



FD 909, 947 and 829



- **Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA**
 - on the application of the principle of **mutual recognition** to judgments in criminal matters imposing **custodial sentences or measures involving** deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union <https://goo.gl/CFbDyD>
- **Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA**
 - on the application of the principle of **mutual recognition** to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the **supervision of probation** measures and alternative sanctions <https://goo.gl/GXZkwi>
- **Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA**
 - on the application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of **mutual recognition** to decisions on **supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention** <https://goo.gl/NHWdXT>

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>

FD 947 and 829 Comparative Overview



	FD 947/2008 on alternative to detention and probation decision	FD 829/2009 on alternatives to provisional detention
General target group	Offenders that being sentenced with an alternative to detention or probation measure want to go back to their countries (consent)	Suspected offenders that want to go back to their country under an alternative to provisional detention (consent)
Aim	Enhance social rehabilitation by preserving offender's ties.	Protection of the victim and general public. Enhancing the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence
Deadline of implementation	6 th December 2011	1 st December 2012
Countries that have implemented	all EU member states countries except UK. Ireland (in progress)	All EU member states countries except: Ireland, Cyprus and ?
Documentation	Certificate + sentence (Adaptation – nature and duration)	Certificate + Decision on the supervision measure (Adaptation – nature and duration)
Grounds of non recognition	Certificate incomplete Art. 11	Certificate incomplete Art. 15

Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA (transfer of prisoners)

- Enforcement of the sentence by the executing State should serve the purpose of facilitating the **social rehabilitation** of the sentenced person.
- **Mutual Trust** – no adaptation of the sentence. Adaptation only in limited cases where the nature and the duration of the sentence are not compatible.
- **Consent of the Person** Article 6 (Limited)
- **Time Limits** 90 days of receipt of the judgment and the certificate. Article 12(2)
- **STEPS 2 Resettlement** (Support for Transfer of European Prison Sentences towards Resettlement) supports effective delivery of FD 909 and resolving legal and practical obstacles to implementation and execution in MS.
<http://steps2.europris.org/en/>
- https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJN_Library_StatusOfImpByCat.aspx?CategoryId=36

Radicalisation and Framework Decisions

Art. 5(4) of FD 947:

*‘Country B declares that monitoring of supervision measures or alternative sanctions by the competent Country B court can be approved **irrespective** of whether the sentenced person has their domicile or permanent residence in Country B, if **because of specific circumstances ties exist between the sentenced person and Country B of such intensity** that it can be assumed that monitoring in Country B will help facilitate the social rehabilitation and reintegration of the sentenced person.’*

Case study



Offender: *“Not only that they did not know the procedure they didn’t even treat me seriously”*

Framework Decisions in Practice

- Early stage of implementation
- Good initial 2016-7 results in FD 947 transfers in some jurisdictions e.g. Netherlands, Latvia
- Most jurisdictions have single figure FD 947 transfers
- FD 829 little used, relatively unknown. An ‘Orphan’?
- Differences in Knowledge, Experience and Promotion
- Procedures are sometimes unknown, long and bureaucratic
- Lack of information and trust
- Language, translations and costs issues
- Data protection to be taken into account in transferring data
- Data gathering and evaluation needed
- https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJN_Library_StatusOfImpByCat.aspx?CategoryId=37 947
- https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/EJN_Library_StatusOfImpByCat.aspx?CategoryId=37 829

Enhancing the implementation of FD 947/829



- Meetings and Expert Meetings since 2008
- Conferences and International Seminars with **EuroPris** and **European Forum for Restorative Justice, Criminal Justice Platform Europe**.
- Planned information resources and practitioner guide
- Developing data gathering mechanisms
- CEP website resources; cep-probation.eu
- Participation in EU projects on FD:
 - ✓ DOMICE
 - ✓ ISTEP (FD 947)
 - ✓ STEPS II (FD 909)
 - ✓ Others
- Europris is providing similar support for FD 909



Some Actions for the future



1. **Information + contact point** → expertise + helpdesk
2. **Make FDs more accessible** → handbook, information, awareness raising
3. **Cooperation** within jurisdictions → one contact point
4. **Training courses** → e-learning, shared events for all professionals involved,
5. **Evaluation of transfers** → data/monitoring system (SPACE I or SPACE II Reports)

Radicalisation Awareness in Practice

- Not all jurisdictions have the same experience or sense of risk
- Assessment and Interventions are still at an early stage of development
- No applications.....yet.
- Differences of Experience and Knowledge
- Local Priorities
- Consent
- Capacity
- Multi-agency co-operation

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

In [RAN Working Groups](#), frontline practitioners share their extensive knowledge and first-hand experience with one another, and peer review each other's practices.

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en

Prison and Probation Working Group (RAN P&P)

The Working Group focuses on supporting these practitioners, who have a role in preventing radicalisation. The group will exchange ideas, best practices, contacts and insights to formulate recommendations for policy making.

COE PC-CP Handbook: Practical Ways of Addressing Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2016)

https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016806f4fbd

- VE and radicalised offenders have no one single profile, no size fits all
- Identification – motivations, needs, grievances, attitudes, personal history, vulnerability
- Screening, assessment, classification
- Not necessarily a need to invest in new programmes and methods – use resources better
- Staff have a very important role – staffing issues come first, frontline staff
- Multi-agency co-operation and information
- Community engagement

COE Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism March 2016

https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=09000016805c1a69

Assessment

Custody as last resort

Admission to prison and allocation

Detection, prevention and dealing with radicalisation and VE in the community and in prison

Security in prisons

Culture and religion

Inter-agency co-operation and information

Disengagement or (De)radicalisation

Post-release work

Capacity building:

- Staff selection and training, empowerment, sufficient staffing
- Creation of networks nationally and internationally
- Research and evaluation
- Communication
- Multi-agency understanding and co-operation
- Media and public opinion
- Cost-effectiveness

CEP actions 2017 - 2018



- ✓ Work with other network organizations including judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other professionals to **develop awareness, e-learning and other programmes**
- ✓ Work with the **European Commission** and others to collect **data** on FD 947/829/909 in practice
- ✓ **Develop a network of experts** with the aim of enabling transfers and discussing FD 947/829 issues in practice
- ✓ Continue organizing **expert meetings** with experts from different jurisdictions
- ✓ **Make updates of the project websites e.g.** probationtransfers.eu
- ✓ **Co-operation and co-ordination** with experts and interests e.g, Europris, EJM, EC, RAN...

Relevant documents



- European Rules on Community Sanction Measures
- Recommendation Rec(2006)2 to member states on the European Prison Rules
- Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1 on the Council of Europe Probation Rules
- Council of Europe handbook and guidelines on dealing with radicalization
- Rec. R (99) 22 concerning prison overcrowding and prison population inflation
- Reports from the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA):
 - Criminal detention and alternatives: fundamental rights aspects in EU cross-border transfers
 - Rights of suspected and accused persons across the EU: translation, interpretation and information
- <http://www.probationtransfers.eu/>
- <http://steps2.euopris.org/>
- www.cep-probation.org
- <https://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/>
- Legal and practitioner handbooks (current and in preparation)
- COE SPACE I (custody) & II (non-custody) <http://www.coe.int/en/web/prison/space>



Thank you!
Merci!
Dank!
Gracias!
Благодаря!
Grazie!

www.cep-probation.org

info@cep-probation.org

Supported by the Justice Programme
of the European Union



Role of the judiciary in disengagement, rehabilitation and de radicalisation.

**Sir John Saunders, formerly a High Court Judge of England and Wales; now
Vice Chairman of the Parole Board**

Speaking Note

1. Role as trial Judge when dealing with suspected extremists:

- Ensure that the trial is fair.
- Pass a fair sentence which is proportionate to the offence
- Pass a rehabilitative sentence where possible
- Particularly important to pass a rehabilitative sentence if possible when sentencing children or young persons
- Pass the least possible sentence commensurate with the requirement to protect the public.
- Set out in detailed sentencing remarks exactly what you conclude the defendant has done and the ways in which you consider he is a danger to the public for assistance of releasing authority.

2. Role as Judge sitting on Parole Board:

- Test for release in England and Wales is that the Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should remain detained’.
- Rehabilitation will never be complete until the prisoner is released into the community.
- Decision whether to release made on the basis of reports from the prison. I.e. from an Imam; a psychologist; probation officers and prison officers who have worked closely with the prisoner in custody
- Difficulties with making decision in terrorist cases is that obtaining reliable risk assessments is a problem
- Difficult to get information from the Security Services and the Counter Terrorist police as to what they know which is relevant to risk.

PREVENTING RADICALISATION IN DETENTION
VIENNA, 12-13 OCTOBER 2017

Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

**THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND DEALING WITH
RADICALISATION IN PRISONS:**

**ITALY'S APPROACH OF USING ANTI-MAFIA TECHNIQUES WITHIN A BROADER
RADICALISATION SETTING**

Nicola Piacente*

INTRODUCTION

Radicalization does not constitute a per se crime does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism.

The work of practitioners should focus on radicalization of any kind leading and related to violent extremism or to acts of terrorism.

Two kinds of radicalization taking place also within detention facilities in Italy can be identified:

- political (involving left and right wing extremists as well as members of anarchic terrorist networks);
- religious.

Figures coming from the cases run against terrorist groups tied to Al Qaida or other terrorist transnational organizations having been run in Italy since late 90's and early 2000's lead to conclude that most of the accused have been radicalized, indoctrinated, recruited into terrorist groups not in their home country but in Italy or in any case within European Borders.

FINDINGS AND FIGURES RELATED TO RADICALIZATION IN PRISONS

Quite often radicalization and indoctrination have been detected and ascertained in detention facilities. Taking advantage from the lack by most of the penitentiary guards - especially in late 90's and early 2000's-, of language skills such as Arab or of proper preparation about dynamics leading to religious/political radicalization and then to terrorism, foreign detainees arrested or sentenced for terrorism crimes have quite often identified and approached other inmates (speaking the same language, sharing the same religious credo) to indoctrinate, radicalize and then recruit them. The inmates having been selected to be indoctrinated to a radicalization process and then to be recruited usually had relevant criminal records, were able to use weapons and available to undertake military training.

Similar indoctrination and recruitment strategies have been used in the past, by sentenced terrorists during the 70's and 80's are still being used by anarchists being sentenced for acts of terrorism.

After the issuance of arrest warrants and/or sentences, public prosecutors and judges, together with National Prison Administration have thus always been dealing with a dilemma:

confine the arrested/sentenced alleged terrorists

- into detention facilities / dedicated sections populated only by other arrested/sentenced terrorists or
- into detention facilities together with other inmates

The second solution would on one side (looking at an optimistic perspective)

give chances to facilitate a socialization and reintegration process for terrorists.

On the other side this solution would also have given the chances to arrested/sentenced terrorists (since they are usually gifted with very strong and rooted extremist credo) to indoctrinate, radicalize and recruit other inmates as potential terrorists.

Following the first option, terrorists are still usually separated from the other inmates.

Such solution

- significantly reduces the possibility to recruit other inmates, but at the same time
- minimizes the chances that a terrorist might decide to deradicalize, disengage from the own group and even cooperate with justice, since such a decision would in any case be detected and prevented by the other inmates.

In any case these separate detention facilities and separate sections are expected to be staffed with personnel properly trained and motivated to detect any sign of repentance and/or decision to deradicalize and/or cooperate with justice

Current figures indicate at the end of 2016, 372 radicalized detainees were confined in national detention facilities:

172 of them are deemed as dangerous and strictly monitored;

39 of them have been arrested/sentenced for crimes with terrorism purposes;

64 of them are under observation

137 of them have been reported as less dangerous radicalized detainees.

Almost all of them are illegal migrants.

272 former detainees being sentenced for minor offences who went through a radicalization process, after serving their sentence, are now free. Some of them are subject to expulsion procedures to their home countries.

Radicalization processes in detention facilities are reported by penitentiary personnel to a special investigative unit operating within detention facilities for further analysis and further report to Antiterrorism Strategies Analysis Committee (C.A.S.A.) as well as to Prosecution Offices

The assessment of the risk of radicalization that might lead to acts of terrorism or preparatory acts in made –after the early detection and analysis by officers working in the penitentiary administration, by above mentioned C.A.S.A.-hereinafter the Committee) that was established on 6 May 2004, pursuant to a decree issued by the Ministry of the Interior.

Members of the Committee are:

the Director general of the Prevention Police (presiding);
 high ranking officers of the main police forces (Carabinieri, Polizia di Stato, Guardia di Finanza and of the Department of the Ministry of Justice supervising the detention facilities¹),
 high ranking offices of the two National Intelligence Agencies (AISI and AISE).

The Committee is a permanent body which is tasked to:

- assess the international and internal terrorist threats any relevant information regarding those threats;
- coordinate the police forces and the intelligence agencies;
- share the information provided with by the police forces and the intelligence agencies;
- support and enforce the decisions to be taken by the Government and Parliament.

C.A.S.A. analyses the information available, ensures the coordination between the intelligence agencies and police forces and provides with the necessary information the relevant agencies.

The Committee thus analyzes and assesses the information about terrorist threats being provided by various institutional sources (including law enforcement and intelligence agencies) and **detention facilities**.

The Committee:

- disseminates the information that has been collected to the relevant police forces;
- plans the action of the main Police Forces so that it is finalized to detect and monitor the terrorist threats:
 - a) by monitoring individuals under suspicion to be close to terrorist groups;
 - b) by monitoring individuals and groups under suspicion to finance terrorist groups;
 - c) by monitoring the dynamics of the detention facilities where members of terrorist groups are confined in order to detect and prevent any indoctrination and recruitment activity;
 - d) by monitoring the jihadist internet websites.

The committee attends also meetings with similar institutions operating in other E.U. Countries aimed at assessing the terrorist threat within E.U.

Prosecution Offices are since 2005 empowered to run preventive intercepts of communications within detention facilities (no use of the outcomes of these intercepts can be made in court) in order detect terrorist threats

The threat of radicalization that might lead to violent extremism and acts of terrorism is also assessed by collecting information within the detention facilities.

Article 4 of law 155/2005, as amended by decree law 7/2015 provides that law enforcement agencies (pursuant to an authorization issued by the Judiciary or the Ministry of Justice) as well as (until 31.1.2016) Intelligence agencies, upon the authorization issued by the Prosecutor General at the request of the Prime Minister, may run informal interviews in detention facilities with inmates that may provide relevant information to prevent the perpetration of a terrorist acts. The National Anti-Mafia and Counter-Terrorism Attorney-General must be notified about the authorization.

The interviews are run without the assistance of a defense counsel, but they need to be recorded
 The outcomes of these informal interviews can't in any case be tendered as evidence before national Courts.

¹ information on the threats and dynamics coming from detention facilities where alleged terrorist members are confined are deemed relevant.

LACUNAE IN THE PROMOTION OF DERADICALIZATION PROCESS

A successful antidote to increasing phenomena of radicalization would be a constructive and effective cooperation between religious leaders (such as imams, priests, pastors) and penitentiary administrations. Not all detainees with religious beliefs other than Christians/Catholics have access to religious services in detention facilities.

The National legislation has not yet provided proper tailored rehabilitation/deradicalization programs specifically set up for terrorist individuals as well as counter narratives and alternative messaging.

One of the reasons is that the biggest majority of individuals being radicalized in prisons are foreigners and NON EU citizens being thus subject to expulsion to their home countries after having served the sentence (unless they are at risk of torture and/or other inhuman treatment when being deported back to their home countries).

Deradicalization is thus quite often an individual decision adopted by the concerned detainee.

The phenomenon of radicalization in detention facilities has been deeply analyzed by the penitentiary Administration through specific studies since 2012.

Quite recently the Ministry of Justice issued some guidelines in order to prevent radicalization in detention facilities.

These guidelines are mainly focused on the phenomena of religious radicalization among foreign detainees

These guidelines point out that radicalization is strictly connected with the lack of reintegration within detention facilities and strongly recommend to all penitentiaries that

- 1) any kind of discrimination and isolation should be banned from detention facilities
- 2) detainees should be assisted by expert social workers, psychologists and when possible cultural mediators helping foreign detainees with integration into society;
- 3) extensive education and Italian language classes within detention facilities should be promoted;
- 4) social stakeholders, such as community and religious leaders as well as family members should be involved in the reintegration process of detainees;
- 5) deradicalization programs should be set up.

These guidelines aim thus at eliminating any separation between arrested/sentenced terrorists and the other detainees in the access to social reintegration and rehabilitation programs.

IMMUNITY, MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THOSE WHO COOPERATE WITH JUSTICE

National legislation has so far provided rules incentivizing disengagement and/or cooperation with justice by ensuring immunity of special mitigating circumstances

if it is agreed that disengagement and cooperation with justice may be linked to (although they cannot be identified with) a deradicalization process, it can be stated that national legislation

provided since the 70's immunity and mitigating circumstances for those who decided to cooperate with justice or disengage themselves from the perpetration of a crime and/or from a terrorist organization.

The National legislation provides with specific incentives those who decide to dissociate themselves from terrorist dynamics and groups and for those who decide to cooperate with Justice

Disengagement is not cooperation.

Disengagement is in fact meant as a change of the own life style following the admission of the own responsibility on the crimes committed. It does not necessarily require specific allegations against the co-perpetrators.

The acknowledgement (made by the Judiciary) of disengagement implies the analysis of the behaviour of the accused inside and outside the detention facilities.

Pursuant to the national case law

- cooperation is a proof of disengagement and at the same time disengagement is also a first step leading to effective cooperation;
- eligibility for immunity and mitigating circumstances (to be acknowledged by the Courts) requires that disengagement and cooperation must be comprehensive, since disengagement must lead the accused to a full dissociation from the own criminal environment;
- cooperation implies wide and extensive statements (to law enforcement agencies and in Courts)
 - i) against the co-perpetrators of the crimes committed by the accused seeking such benefits and
 - ii) against the members of the criminal group the concerned accused participated to.

Those who have been sentenced for terrorist crimes are not eligible to some benefits such as house arrests, anticipated release, release on probation, unless they cooperate with justice

Pursuant to a more recent National case law, in order to promote social reintegration also of those sentenced for terrorist crimes, those benefits can be provided with also to sentenced terrorists who did not cooperate with justice if they did not commit violent crimes.

Some of these incentives (such as immunity, mitigating circumstances, anticipated release, release on probation) had already been legislated at the times of terrorist attacks carried on in Italy since the seventies by terrorist organizations, in order to effectively fight terrorist organization through the cooperation provided with by the insiders.

These incentives were regulated before any legislation

- criminalizing mafia associations (1982) and
- promoting cooperation with justice by members of mafia organizations (1991).

Article 308 of the Criminal Code grants immunity for those who, before the perpetration

- of crimes with terrorism purposes (listed from 270 bis to 289 bis of the Criminal Code),
- of the crimes affecting the International Legal personality of the State

a) prevent those crimes from being committed,

- b) dismantle and /or contribute to dismantle the terrorist association as well as,
- c) dissociate/disengage themselves from any kind of conspiracy and/or from the terrorist association

Article 308 of the Criminal Code grants immunity to those who before the perpetration

- of the above listed misconduct being criminalized by articles from 270 bis to 289 bis of the Criminal Code,

- of the crimes affecting the International Legal personality of the State

Falling under the criminal scheme of an armed gang

- a) prevent those crimes from being committed,
- b) dismantle and /or contribute to dismantle the armed gang as well as,
- c) dissociate themselves from the armed gang (unless they promoted, organized, managed the armed gang) and/or surrender themselves and their weapons to the Police

article. 4 of law 15/1980 grants a mitigating circumstance for the perpetrators of crimes committed for terrorism purposes, when they dissociate themselves from the co perpetrators, effectively provide law enforcement agencies with significant evidence against the other co perpetrators so that they can be identified and arrested

Law no. 304/1982 provides for:

- exemption from punishment for those who, having committed only offences related to their membership to a criminal organization, withdraw from the agreement, or withdraw from the organization or from the terrorist group or facilitate the dismantling of the organization or group;
- exemption from punishment in case of attacks and attempted attacks, if the perpetrators prevent the event or supply evidence necessary to ensure an accurate reconstruction of the facts and the identification of any other co perpetrator;
- the granting of mitigating circumstances to persons charged with terrorist crimes who, before the conviction, dissociate themselves from the subversive organizations and make a full confession of the offences committed and effectively cooperate to annul or mitigate the consequences deriving from such crimes, or to prevent the perpetration of other related types of criminal conduct;
- the granting of mitigating circumstances to persons charged with terrorist crimes who, besides having dissociated themselves from the criminal association and confessed the offences committed, effectively cooperate with the judicial authorities in gathering decisive evidence to identify and apprehend the perpetrators of terrorist acts, or to find evidence useful for the reconstruction of the offences and to identify the persons responsible for such offences;

Law no. 34/1987 provides for a reduction of penalty for terrorist crimes or the subversion of the constitutional order for those who, having been charged with, or sentenced for, offences committed for purposes of terrorism or subversion of the constitutional order, have once and for all dissociated themselves from the organization or the terrorist or subversive group they were members of.

Article 6 of decree law. 8/1991 grants a mitigating circumstance for those who, after the perpetration of a kidnapping for purposes of terrorism or for subversion of the democratic order (punishable pursuant to the above mentioned article 289 bis of the Criminal Code) , dissociate themselves for the other co perpetrators and significantly cooperate with Law enforcement agencies in facilitating the liberation of the victim and ensure his/her safety.

Since 2001, the legislation promoting cooperation with justice by participants to mafia organizations through the provision of special mitigating circumstances and protection measures was extended to the accused of crimes of terrorism

Since 2001 Protection measures can be provided with only to those accused of crimes committed with terrorism purposes who cooperate with justice

Decree law 8/1991, modified by the law 45/2001 provides for protective measures (such as relocation to be extended also to family members, change of identity, transfer of detained collaborators of justice to safe detention facilities) and financial aid for those who decide to cooperate with justice with reference to crimes committed with terrorism and/or subversion of the Constitutional order or other serious crime. Such measures can be applied to witnesses and to collaborators of justice (that is any person who faces criminal charges, or has been convicted of having taken part in an association of criminals or other criminal organization of any kind, or in organized crime offences, but agrees to co-operate with criminal justice authorities, particularly by giving information or testimony about the criminal association or organization or any offence connected with organized crime or other serious crimes).

The assessment of the credibility of the those who decide to cooperate with justice and the consequent decision on the eligibility to be granted protective measure are issued (at the request of the Prosecutors collecting the statements of the collaborator of justice concerned) by a committee whose members are (among others) an under Secretary of State and two magistrates

Such assessment requires criteria such as:

- a timely guilty plea and/or detailed confession and acknowledgement of the crimes they committed (such conduct can be assimilated to a deradicalization process);
- the supply of relevant information on their assets and proceeds derived from the perpetration of the crimes or being/having been used for the perpetration of crimes that can be forfeited/confiscated and on the assets and proceeds of the other members of the criminal group they participated to;
- the supply of accurate and up-to-date information about the criminal organisations and the crimes perpetrated by their members;
- the supply of accurate and up-to-date information that would enable law enforcement and other relevant agencies to prevent criminal groups from committing further crimes.

The assessment of these criteria takes also into consideration decisions issued by the Courts who did evaluate the evidence provided by the concerned collaborator

Decree law 8/1991, amended by /2001 law, identifies the prerequisites necessary to be eligible for protective measures for those who decide to cooperate with justice

Pursuant to the Law, when assessing the credibility and relevance of the contribution provided with by a collaborator of justice, the relevant Authorities need to consider that particularly relevant can be deemed the information/testimony, related to a serious offence:

- that is necessary (e.g. if it is the only source of evidence) to start an investigation or to prevent a crime from being committed;
- that is credible (genuine and spontaneous);
- that is the crucial evidence available in order to prosecute a specific serious offence;
- that is needed to corroborate other evidence in order to successfully prosecute a specific serious offence;

- that is crucial in order to dismantle a terrorist organization and detect the proceeds derived from the perpetration of crimes;

that, despite other evidence available, is going to be subject to bribery or intimidation.

THE ROLE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

The inclusion of sentenced terrorists into a process of restorative justice is still debated.

In order to focus the attention on the victims of terrorist crimes committed in Italy in the '70s and '80s and promote a reconciliation process between those victims and the perpetrators, attempts have been made to set up a process of social mediation that would promote some form of dialogue between terrorists and victims, through the aid of expert mediators.

That dialogue is an attempt to match the desire of justice and truth of the victims and at the same time the desire of full reintegration into society of the perpetrators.

NGO's have organized so far meetings between victims and direct perpetrators or victims and perpetrators of crimes of the same kind.

Many of these meetings have not been financed nor supervised by public institutions.

Among these meetings, an initiative involving sentenced terrorists and victims of acts of terrorism must be mentioned. Some sentenced terrorists (all of them are former members of extremist left wing terrorist groups) have participated to various meetings aimed at promoting a reconciliation process with the victims of the crimes they were sentenced for.

These meetings have been deemed as prerequisites of a reintegration process into society that has so far involved some sentenced terrorists for crimes committed during the 70's and 80's and a few victims.

These meetings have been held within the framework of restorative or remedial justice, aiming at achieving, even beyond the well-known cases of generalized use in specific historical circumstances, the goal of rehabilitation.

The judiciary has not been involved in these initiatives, since the current approach is aimed at focusing the restorative justice mainly on the rights of the victims. One of the prerequisites to set up the condition of vulnerability of the victim is the seriousness of the crimes committed against them, including crimes for terrorism purposes. It is debated whether the above mentioned initiatives are aimed at protecting victims or at facilitating the reintegration of sentenced terrorists into society



Custodial Institutions Agency
Ministry of Security and Justice

The Dutch Experience

Yola Wanders

Director high security prison Vught

Vienna 12-13 October 2017



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020



Custodial Institutions Agency
Ministry of Security and Justice





Effects of Imprison

- Feeling insecure, fearful or angry
- Frustration about rules and treatment
- Frustration about environment



Risk of Radicalisation

- Grief and/or system hate
- Feelings of injustice
- Easy prey for recruiters and jihadists
- Jihadists, activists and criminals become interwoven with each other networks (terror crime nexus)




Prevention / Challenge

- Prison environment
- Treatment / staff
- Multi agency approach / sharing info
- Living climate



How to detect (in all prisons)

- Awareness training for staff
- Attention officer(s) in every prison
- Support expertteam as back-up
- Reporting to detainees intelligence team
- If proselitism / rekrutment: then placing terrorist wing



Terrorist department / five wings




Placement conditions

Suspect of
terrorist crime

Convicted for
terrorist crime

Recruitment
during detention

For men
and woman





Regime highlights



small groups




monitoring communication



extended level security



32 hrs a week program time



Labour



Effects of concentration



Unable to recruit

Increased visible

Trained staff

Experts interventions




Gang forming

Disruption by
group-influence

New networks


Enhancement
of beliefs






IS supporters

Role models



Differences in
radicalization



Right extremists

Differentiation Challenges



Moslim haters



Women



Mental problems



Al nusra fighters



Behavioral problems



Six-weeks observation

- VERA II
- Information police
- Information public prosecutor
- Observation staff
- Intake / screening psychologist




Profiles

Ideologues

Followers

Criminal
Opportunists





Possibility to disengage believes, attitudes and behaviour

Ideologues

Followers

Criminal
Opportunists





Intervention strategy

Ideologues

Followers

Criminal
Opportunists

Unlikely

Repression
segregation

Possible

Intervention
disengagement/
integration

Likely

Prevention
counter
radicalisation
crime/violence

Leaders / Ideologues

- Separate wing
- Extended regime
- No influence on others possible
- Intensive countering activities

Followers

- Separate wing
- Phases to lighter regime
- Tailor made interventions

Criminal opportunist

- Separate wing
- Phases to lighter regime
- Radicalisation prevention
- Recidivism programs



Disengagement interventions

- Social pedagogical approach
- Tailor made treatment
- Support family of radical offenders
- System-therapy
- Re-orientation of religion
- Education



Monitoring TA Wing

- Phone tap
- Reading letters
- Tap visit relatives
- Audio and camera surveillance
- Behavior observation



Detainees Intelligence teams

Part of National Police

- Coordinate all information between prisons / police and prosecution
- Sharing information arranged in covenant and circulairs. Is based on statutory regulation.





Outplacement

In the last year of the sentence one can be transferred to a regular prison if:

- No escape risk
- No extradition
- No signs of recruitment in the last year



Custodial Institutions Agency
Ministry of Security and Justice

The
End

Yola Wanders
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The need for a coherent approach in relation to policy, infrastructure, staff training and risk assessment when dealing with radicalized offenders’.




Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

Koen D’Haenens
Belgian Prison Administration
Cell Extremism



I. DETECTION OF RADICALIZATION



Detection = “how” do we find these people?

■ Method

1. On remand or convicted for offences under terrorism law
2. Information from external partners (Federal Police Terrorism Unit, Secret Service, OCAD)
3. **Information from the prisons (Local Level)**
 - Duty of all staff = **awareness** for and **reporting** signals of radicalization
 - Signals
 - Material (literature, drawings, weapons, ...)
 - (change in) behavior (connection to other known radicalized prisoners, excessive praying, ...)
 - (change in) appearance
 - Reports from other prisoners
 - In word (glorification of attacks, ...)



Detection = “how” do we find these people?

=> Unit Extremism (Central Level)

- Analysis and interpretation of information received from local level and external partners
- Placing of prisoners on list in function of further monitoring and risk assessment (if not, local level is asked to further monitor the detainee and providing feedback to Unit Extremism)



Detection = “how” do we find these people?

- **Result** = list with 4 categories:
 - A. On remand or convicted for offences under **terrorism law**
-> automatically
 - B. On remand for or convicted for **terrorism related** offences (e.g. theft with a financial link to terrorism) or **equated detainees** meaning that they aren't detained for offences under terrorism law but are showing behavior closely linked to the profile of a violent extremist offender.
-> multi-agency approach (external partners, CPSS extremism)
 - C. Foreign Terrorist Fighters
-> automatically
 - D. Detainees showing signals of radicalization or who are radicalizing others (or if suspected)
-> multi-agency approach



Detection = “how” do we find these people?

▪ Pitfalls and benefits

- - **Quality of information depends on degree of knowledge about the topic (false positives)**
 - > importance of training!!
 - Constant and thorough training security staff
 - Ten-day specialized training for directors, psychologists, social assistants
 - **Those who stay under the radar (false negatives)**

+

- **Unit extremism: multi-agency approach**
- **Decision at the central level guarantees:**
 - **Same way of analyzing and interpreting signals**



II. MONITORING OF RADICALIZED PRISONERS



Monitoring

- **Starting point is list from Unit Extremism, i.e. detected prisoners**

<u>Total</u>	222
Category A	54
Category B	33
Category C	97
Category D:	38

- **Monitoring at local (prison) and at central level (Unit extremism and Central psychosocial service extremism)**



Monitoring

Goal = prison allocation and regimes

- **Allocation (hybrid model: dispersal and concentration):**
 - **Specialized wings (leaders/recruiters): 2**
 - **Satellite prisons: 5**
 - **Other prisons**
- **Regimes:**
 - **Visitors**
 - **Work**
 - **Sports/Leisure**
 - **Telephone contact ...**



Monitoring

- **Tools for monitoring:**
 - **At local level**
 - **Observation list** (prison wards) on a daily basis
 - **Evaluation list** (members of psychosocial service and prison governors): send every 3 months to central level
 - **At central level**
 - **Placement files**
 - **Regular meetings** (every 3 months) with local prison staff (prison governor, member of psychosocial service)



III. RISK ASSESSMENT OF RADICALIZED PRISONERS



Risk Assessment: why, who and how

Why?

To assess the risks and needs in function of detention planning and the mode of the execution of sanctions:

- leaves**
- electronic monitoring**
- conditional release ...**



Risk Assessment: why, who and how

Who?

- **Identified radicalized convicted prisoners**
 - **Category A (terrorism law)**
 - **Category C (FTF)**




Risk Assessment: why, who and how

How?


VERA-2R (Violence Extremism Risk Assessment, E. Pressman)

- **SPJ method**
 - > empirical basis indicators



Risk Assessment: who, how and why?

Risk Assessment Process Doyle & Logan (2011)



Risk Assessment: challenges and benefits

Benefits

- ❑ Structured, systematic assessment of empirical based indicators (same language)
- ❑ Shows which information is still missing and should be sought-after.
- ❑ Indicators are dynamic: risk trajectories
- ❑ Scenarioplanning based on solid information
- ❑ Risk management strategies



Risk Assessment: challenges and benefits

Challenges

- ❑ Risk indicators are informed by and limited by the state of knowledge
- ❑ Result is a professional judgement, not a silver bullet
- ❑ Uncertainty in terrorism : unpredictable triggers (personal, local, global), changes in strategy, modus operandi, ...
- ❑ Caution: deception, lying in personal contact and in behavior (cfr. “How to survive in the West, A Mujahid Guide”)
- ❑ Incarceration makes certain risk factors less visible (more difficult to assess)
- ❑ Time consuming



Thank you for your attention
Further questions?

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Main issues and challenges in relation to the need for multi-agency cooperation when dealing with radicalised offenders

Vienna 2017-10-12

Håkan Zandén, Director Probation Service Halland och Västra Götaland



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

Swedish Prison and Probation Service - Our task



The Swedish Prison and Probation Service is responsible for:

- implementing imposed sanctions, prison or probation
- operating remand prisons
- Carry out pre-sentence investigations in criminal cases

The Swedish Prison and Probation Service shall work to:

- implement sanctions in a secure, humane and effective manner
- facilitate the effective implementation of the law
- prevent the recurrence of criminal offences





Organisation

- Head office in Norrköping
- Six regions
Each region has its own area of activity, consisting of one or more locations
- A budget of SEK 8.7 billion
- Remand institutions, imprisonment/institutions, non custodial care
- National transport service NTE



Sanctions

- Prison
- Intensive supervision
- Conditional sentence
- Probation
- Community service
- Probation with specific treatment plan – contract treatment




Personnel

- Director general: Nils Öberg
- Over 500 managers
- About 12 000 employees
- Over 70 different job categories



Number of clients on a regular day



Remand

- The Prison and Probation Service is responsible for the country's 30 remand institutions
- On 1 October 2016, 1399 persons were remanded in custody
- Persons who are being handled subject to legislation on social services, care of young persons or care of substance abusers and asylum seekers awaiting deportation can also be placed on remand

Imprisonment/ Institutions

- The work of the prisons shall be designed to promote the inmate's rehabilitation in society and counteract damaging consequences of liberty
- The prison term shall aim from the beginning to be a preparation for release
- The Prison and Probation Service has 48 prisons in Sweden
- On 1 October 2016, 4231 persons were serving prison sentences
- The commonest offences were narcotics offences and smuggling, assault and theft.
- The prisons have a security classification from 1 to 3, 1 being the highest security and 3 the lowest

Employment for inmates

Time spent in prison shall be used to reduce the risk of reoffending. Various measures shall be taken to increase the probability of clients' living a life without offending after their sentence has been completed

- Treatment programmes
- Work
- Studies

- **Other structured activities**

(Training in social skills is an example of a structured activity in which inmates can receive practical training in day-to-day tasks. This includes learning to clean, wash clothes and make food, for example, but also being able to plan one's private economy. Other examples are yoga, pottery and cultural activities, which are offered in many prisons)

Situation, violent extremism in the Prison and Probation Service

- There are less than 20 people in the Prison (and Probation) Service, which are judged as transmitters
- There are few violent political extremists and they are not expected to have a significant impact on the security situation.
- The influential attempts observed are largely from individuals belonging to Islamic extremism.
- 7 people are convicted of terrorist offenses

Measures taken

- The Prison and Probation service has collaborated with the national coordinator of violence-violent extremism, the police authority, the National Board of Social Affairs, the Security Police, and the National Board of Institutional care
- The Prison and Probation service follows and continues to contribute to the international development of working methods and methods by participating in various cooperation forums. EuroPris Working Group Against Violence Extremism, RAN P & P Core Planning Group and Confederation of European Probation (CEP).

Non-custodial care

- Non-custodial care covers clients who have been sentenced to probation, community service or contract treatment or who have been conditionally released or have been tagged as an alternative to a custodial sentence
- The probation service performs initial personal investigations of suspects before court proceedings on behalf of the court
- The probation service has 34 offices
- The Probation Service is aimed primarily at the supervision of persons conditionally released on probation, with or without contract treatment/community service; intensive supervision with electronic monitoring; work at remand centers and prisons and preparing client social reports.

Probation Service in Sweden

- 34 probation offices
- 12 manage areas
- About 11000 clients
- About 1200 employees



What is Strategic Training Initiative in Community Supervision (STICS)?


- An evidence based model from Canada for training and supervising probation officers to better adhere to the RNR principles
- The probation officer's role becomes more of a *change agent* rather than a *case manager*
- In Sweden, the model is called Krimstics

The RNR principles in STICS

- The **Risk** principle: the higher the risk, the more intensive degree of treatment
- The **Need** principle: target criminogenic needs, and in particular pro-criminal attitudes
- The **Responsivity** principle: use CBT techniques, focus on relationship building, collaboration and adapt to the client

Probation service in Halland and Västra Götaland (counties)

- 46 Municipalities, Offices in Skövde, Borås, Vänersborg and Halmstad
- 7 District Courts
- Coordination within the legal chain, (Prosecution director, Chief Judge, Police chief, Prison and Probation director)
- Prisons
- 120 Probation officers
- 5 Krami
- (Social, Employment, Probation)



Inter-agency cooperation Västra Götaland




Skaraborg

- Joint working group with 15 Municipalities, Police, Security Police
- Joint action plan against violent extremism
- Workshop with The national coordinator for protecting democracy against violent extremism
- Seminar hands on, Probation officers, Social workers

Fyrbodal (17 Municipalities)

- Probation service, 5 Municipalities ,Employment agency
- Conference,
 - Keynote speaker from The national coordinator for protecting democracy against violent extremism, Amir Rostami
 - Method: National Council for Crime Prevention
- Reality
 - City of Trollhättan, Sweden school attack: horror as sword attacker kills two teachers and pupil



Inter-agency cooperation Halland




Cooperation agreement, Municipalities, the Police, Prison and Probation services

Conference, " Exclusion of young people in Halland"

- Six Municipalities .Police, security Police, labor authority, emergency services
- Director General, opening speech and a debate article
- The national coordinator for protecting democracy against violent extremism, keynote speaker
- Method (National Council for Crime Prevention)
 - Table
 - Process
 - Working in progress/ Municipalities
- Media
 - TV, Radio, newspapers

Joint Community Intervention Team in Laholm



Inter-agency cooperation reduce recidivism

- Case manager/ Change agent, Probation officer
- Cooperation agreement
- Conference, National Council for Crime Prevention
- Three agencies
 - KRAMI

SAMVERKAN



Handlingsplan - Samarbete mot våldsbejakande extremism i Skaraborg

Inledning

Polisområde Skaraborg och Säkerhetspolisen har inlett ett samarbete mot våldsbejakande extremism med samtliga 15 kommuner i Skaraborg, Migrationsverket och Kriminalvården. Arbetsgruppen har utarbetat en handlingsplan, som revideras efter uppkommet behov.

Bakgrund

Idag finns det personer i Sverige som stödjer terrorism i olika delar av världen. Det finns också personer som reser utomlands för att delta i träning kopplad till terrorism och andra olagliga våldshandlingar. Attentatshotet från våldsbe-



Hur kan vi förebygga nyrekrytering samt arbeta med personer som väljer/önskar att lämna kriminella gäng?



Samverkande myndigheter; Vänersborgs kommun, Trollhättans Stad, Arbetsförmedlingen och Kriminalvården bjuder in till heldagskonferens kring rubricerat tema.


**Boka den 5 oktober redan nu.
Program med anmälan skickas ut i augusti!**

Målgruppen är chefer, beslutsfattare och politiker inom de berörda myndigheterna samt andra nyckelpersoner som arbetar med frågan.

**Vi utlovar en givande dag!
Välkommen!**

Vid frågor kontakta:
Monica Lejon
monica.lejon@kriminalvarden.se
0521-74 25 25
076-133 83 00

 Arbetsförmedlingen



Seminarium - samarbete mot våldsbejakande extremism i Skaraborg

Polismråde Skaraborg bjuder i samverkan med flera aktörer, in till ett seminarium, med temat våldsbejakande extremism. Torsdagen den 24 september klockan 09.00-15.30, Frejasalen, Skövde Kulturhus.


Våldsbejakande extremism är ett samlingsbegrepp för rörelser, ideologier eller miljöer som inte accepterar en demokratisk samhällsordning och som fränjar våld för att uppnå ett ideologiskt mål.

Medverkande under dagen är representanter från den Nationella samordnaren mot våldsbejakande extremism, representanter från Försvarshögskolan och Säkerhetspolisen.





Samverkansöverenskommelse 2015
mellan
lokalspolismråde Halmstad, Kriminalvården och Halmstads kommun



Samverkansöverenskommelse 2015
mellan
Lokalspolismråde Laholm, Kriminalvården och Laholms kommun



Upplysning
Halmstads kommun, Kriminalvården och lokalspolismråde Halmstads målsetting med samverkan är att bestraffningen ska minska och tryggheten ska öka.

Bakgrund
Halmstads kommun, Polismyndigheten och Kriminalvården har sedan flera år ett nära och väl fungerande samarbete inom en mängd olika områden. Samverkan mellan berörda aktörer sker genom regelbunden ledningsamverkan på den lokala nivån. Vid ledningsmötena medverkar kommunchef, säkerhetschef/ledningschef, lokalspolismålschef samt kriminalvårdschefen.

2010 tog Rikspolisstyrelsen tilläta till att teckna samverkansavtal med samtliga kommuner i lärodet. Halmstads kommun och polismyndigheten i Hållands län har sedan 2011 haft samverkansavtal. Kriminalvården tog initiativ till att vara en del av samverkansavtalet under 2014.

Syfte
Överenskommelsens kortfristiga syfte är att skapa en gemensam bild av de prioriterade samverkanområdena och vilka åtgärder som kommer att vidtas inom dessa.
Det långfristiga syftet är att använda samverkansöverenskommelsen som ett instrument för fortsatta diskussioner om prioriteringar, gemensamma insatser och utvecklingsmöjligheter.

Prioriterade målområden
Utifrån en gemensam problembild har två prioriteringar för 2015 tagits fram:

1. Förebyggande arbete mot att öka återfall i brott.
2. Genom tvärvärdig skapning av gemensam bild kring invarnas behov av trygghet.

Utvärdering
Parterna är överens om att överenskommelsen ska utvärderas innan 2015 öppet ut och inför arbetet med en eventuell ny överenskommelse för 2016.

Övergripande målsetting
Överenskommelsen knyter an till Laholms kommuns vägledande målsetting att kommunen ska vara en trygg kommun att växa upp, bo och leva i.

Bakgrund
Laholms kommun, Polismyndigheten och Kriminalvården har sedan flera år ett nära och väl fungerande samarbete inom en mängd olika områden. Samverkan mellan berörda aktörer sker genom regelbunden ledningsamverkan på den lokala nivån. Vid ledningsmötena medverkar kommunchef, säkerhetschef/ledningschef, lokalspolismålschef samt kriminalvårdschefen.

Polisen står under organisatorisk förändring och lokalspolismålschefen kommer under hösten 2015 att ersättas av kommunpolis med placering i Laholm. Kriminalvården kommer att representeras av VD för Anstalt och Hållre samt VD för Frivården.

Samverkan finns reglerad i handlingsplan för samverkan mellan polis och kommun (2014) samt skriftlig handlingsplan för samverkan mellan kommun och polis från 2014.

Från 2013 ingår Kriminalvården i den lokalt reglerade samverkansstrukturen. I särskild ordning har etablerats sociala insatser i syfte att förebygga att unga (prioriterade) och övriga åldersgrupper 30 år gamla identifieras i kriminalitet.

Syfte
Överenskommelsens syfte är att säkerställa en fortsatt och systematisk samverkan mellan Laholms kommun, Polismyndigheten och Kriminalvården.
Det långfristiga syftet är att använda samverkansöverenskommelsen som ett instrument för fortsatta diskussioner om prioriteringar, gemensamma insatser och utvecklingsmöjligheter.

Prioriterade målområden
Utifrån en gemensam problembild har två prioriteringar för 2015 tagits fram:

1. Viktarevackla och fullfölja samverkan kring sociala insatser (förebyggande av att unga, 15-24 år, hamnar i och återfall i kriminalitet).
2. Genom tvärvärdig skapning av gemensam bild kring invarnas behov av trygghet.



Kriminalvården genomför sin årliga samverkanskonferens för att minska återfall i brott, torsdagen den 8 oktober 2015 på Varbergs stadshotell.

Årets tema: Utanförskap bland unga i Halland.

Kriminalvårdens generaldirektör Nils Öberg inledningstalar om utanförskap och samverkans betydelse i syfte att minska återfall i brott.

Föreläsare

Mona Sahlin, Nationell samordnare mot våldsbejakande extremism.

Amir Rostami, Sociolog, forskare och kriminalkommissarie kommer att föreläsa om utanförskap kopplat till gängkriminalitet.

Kristoffer Johansson, Nationell samordnare för unga KRIS och

Rebecca Svart, Vice ordförande för Unga KRIS berättar om sina erfarenheter av utanförskap i Halland.

Seminarier kommer att ge möjlighet att tillsammans diskutera och utforma förslag på samverkansstrukturer.






Thank´s for your attention!

Contact:
Håkan Zandén
e-post: hakan.zanden@kriminalvarden.se
www.kriminalvarden.se



**WE BREAK
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE**

**KRIM:
VÅRD**



**VI BRYTER DEN
ONDA CIRKELN**

**KRIM:
VÅRD**





BUNDESMINISTERIUM
FÜR JUSTIZ

PREVENTING RADICALIZATION IN DETENTION - AUSTRIA

ERA-Seminar, October 12/13 2017,
Vienna



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020



Overview

- Austrian Prison System in General
- accused and convicted FTFs in Austrian Prisons
- measures of De-Radicalisation – Overview
- more in depth Care and Rehabilitation Programmes
- future steps to be made



Facts (as per 01.10.2017)

- 8860 detainees (93% total capacity)
 - 3,97 % electronic monitoring (352)
 - 6% female (520)
 - 1% juveniles (144)
 - 54% foreign countries, 100 different nationalities

Facts

- 3900 prison staff
 - 3200 uniformed staff
 - doctors, psychologists, social workers, pastors, pedagogues, therapists, nurses, administrative personnel and more staff with specialised training history

Accused or convicted prisoners pursuant to sections 278b et seqq. Criminal Code (as per 01.10.2017)

- 64 detainees
 - separated in 22 prisons
 - 26 have been legally convicted
 - 3 female
 - 11 young adults

Exchange concerning De-Radicalisation within Austrian Prison Service

- MoJ Task Force “De-Radicalisation in Prisons”
- semi-annual executive conference with all prison directors (+ 2 optional additional meetings)
- profession seminars with special focus (social worker meeting, executives, etc.)

Bilateral/Multilateral exchange concerning extremism and new phenomena

- cooperation with Federal agency for state protection and counter terrorism
- networks on national level
(nationwide, federal provinces)
- cooperation of international level
(Council of Europe, EuroPris, MECR, RAN, ICPA)

Dealing with extremism phenomena in Austrian Prison Service

- Prevention
 - Sensibilization of
 - Staff
 - Prisoners
 - Screening tool for social workers
 - DERAD
 - Federal agency for state protection and counter terrorism
- Deradicalisation
 - Training of Staff
 - Multidisciplinary network
 - Screening
 - Workshop Multipliers

Measures of De-Radicalisation in Austrian Prison Service

- mandatory sentence planning
- support concept with NEUSTART and the DERAD (social cohesion network for dialogue, prevention of extremism and democracy)
- Training skills for psychologists and social workers in cooperation of the Violence Prevention network

Comprehensive counselling mode concerning De-Radicalisation

- Multiple check
 - interdisciplinary teams
 - external professionals
 - Federal agency for state protection and counter terrorism
 - release preparation (NEUSTART, DERAD, Aussteigerprogramm, etc.)

Current steps

- DARE-Project Start November 2017: training of risk assessment VERA-2R
- workshop for multipliers (prison staff) start 2018
- coaching and mentoring with support of VPN
- improvement of the cooperation between prison staff and Federal agency for state protection and counter terrorism: kick-off meeting spring 2018



**THANK YOU FOR YOUR
ATTENTION**

***ERA-SEMINAR „PREVENTING
RADICALISATION IN DETENTION“
Vienna, 12th and 13th October 2017***



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

LECTURE 13.10.2017, 09:45 h

**„EUROPRIS` GENERAL BASIC RULES
ON PRISON CHAPLAINCY AND DE-
RADICALISATION; THE GERMAN [AND
CATALAN] MULTI-FAITH CHAPLAINCY
APPROACHES TO DERADICALISATION“**

By Dr. Hans Kieserling, Hessisches Ministerium der Justiz, Wiesbaden

Thank you for the invitation.

Thank you that we can be here in this beautiful city...

I.

In the EU Member States and many other states, we all have a fundamental right to freedom of religion. The religions and confessions must be treated equally.

It is obvious that also religious prisoners can practice their religion, as long as other prisoners and in particular the institution's safety and order are not affected. "Religious practice" must be interpreted broadly, that includes worship, individual or group conversations, prayers, meditations etc.

We think that spiritual welfare is an important tool against radicalisation. This is primarily to combat *religious* radicalisation, but also extreme left and extreme right-wing radicalisation.

By a sufficient external support and sufficient opportunities for own religious practices of the prisoners, radicalisation can generally be reduced and in particular religious radicalisation can be countered, for example by clarifying or unmasking incorrect mixing of religion and ideology.

In particular, the Islamic Imams support prevention and de-radicalisation, when they question and discuss radical views of extremist prisoners. They can affect radical beliefs and their dissemination by religious beliefs.

II.

Radicalisation is a problem of the whole society, that can escalate and spread particularly in prisons, but here, it can be fought specifically.

In November 2015, the EuroPris Radicalisation expert group had its first meeting here in Vienna, the next was in April 2016 in Barcelona. The expert group worked out various subjects and found out that the subjects

- Risk assessment tools,
- Chaplaincy and
- Identification of radicalized offenders

should have priority. So we built 3 sub-groups.

Dr. Julio Zino and I have chaired the sub-working group Chaplaincy and we prepared universal rules for Prison Chaplaincy and Deradicalisation.

(We would like to present these universal rules: - printed handouts?)

III.

A. Principles

- I. All prisoners have to be treated with respect of the human dignity and their fundamental rights, taking into account their specific situation and their individual - even religious – needs; at the same time the general public has to be protected effectively from criminal acts.
- II. No man or woman loses his or her God-given dignity. A part of reasonable treatment in prison is the offer that all prisoners may have contact with the chaplaincy service of their religious community and receive assistance.
- III. Prisoners should also have the right to hold religious objects in their cells, pertaining to their specific faith - as long as these objects can not be dangerous for the prisoners, the prison staff or the public.
- IV. The State is neutral and must not favor any religious group or denomination. Nevertheless the State and his prison service must guarantee a prisoner's right to religious assistance. But no prisoner should be forced to practice religion against his intention or to receive unsolicited proposals of religious care during his or her stay in prison.
- V. All prisoners are entitled to participate in religious services and celebrations of their own faith or another religion or confession. This right may be restricted only for overriding reasons of security.

B. Religious care as an element of deradicalisation in prisons

- VI. Religious care is an important element to help to prevent all forms of radicalisation, e.g. extreme left or right-wing or extreme radicalized religious groups. Therefore, it allows prisoners to exercise their rights, and they have also the possibility to practice their faith in a none-radical manner.
- VII. We accept that there are several forms of religious care within prisons, e.g. religious service, one to one or group meetings, celebrations of religious festivals, etc., or otherwise it's left to the religious communities or denominations to decide.
- VIII. A moderate and tolerant religious care is particularly important to help to prevent all forms - especially religious forms – of radicalisation. A widespread religious offer helps to decrease radicalisation and increases the possibilities to recognize and combat radicalisation. Moderate and tolerant religious care allows voluntary relationships to be built between the chaplains and prisoners, even inmates vulnerable to radicalisation. This reduces the influence of other - possibly radicalising - forces.
- IX. Prison chaplains contribute to the cohesion of community by promoting encounters and dialogues between people with different religions and cultures and can strengthen dialogues between different faiths. Thus, the religious care reduces cleavage phenomena such as political or religious extremism.
- X. Prison chaplains promote also tolerance within the own religious group and with the other social groups.
- XI. It is very important that moderate prison chaplains are carefully selecty in order to promote a moderate and tolerant religious care. Before starting pastoral work, a chaplain must tolerate a security check on his own person. It is also important that prison authorities inform new chaplains about prison regulations that may affect them. Moreover, in each prison there should be a staff member to act as the coordinator between the prison management and the chaplains of the different religions and denominations.

Moreover, in each prison certain staff members should be assigned to carry out functions of coordination and reference to chaplains of different religions and denominations.

- XII. In order to select a chaplain, prison authorities need the support and endorsement of the appropriate external religious community. The prison chaplains should use, as far as possible, the official language(s) of the country. It must be recognized that certain religious rituals may require the use of their preceptive language.
- XIII. All prison chaplains commit themselves in particular to equality between men and women. Women's rights are human rights.
- XIV. Prison chaplains must be capable and ready to detect a tendency towards radicalisation of prisoners. And they must be capable and ready to deconstruct the ideologies underlying radicalisation. Thus, the mixing of religion and ideology can thereby be shown to the prisoner.
- XV. Prison chaplains hold in confidence the conversations between themselves and prisoners. If a prison chaplain recognizes that the contents of a conversation could threaten the security in prison or for the public, they have to inform the prison authorities about the danger.
- XVI. The whole prison staff must be trained in cultural and religious awareness in order to handle the multicultural and religious background of the prisoners in a sensitive manner. This is important because their behavior influences the prison's climate and therefore the own safety and the safety of the prisoners. It would also be desirable that prison authorities designate a person responsible to inform the prison staff about religious and cultural diversity and to answer their queries.
- XVII. The prison chaplains can support prisoners not only in religious matters. This can also apply after release from prison, as well for the family of the prisoner.)

IV.

In Germany, I work for the Ministry of Justice of the German Federal State Hesse. I cannot speak for whole Germany, but for my federal state and its prison system.

In Hesse ("Hessen"), we have nearly the same number of prisoners of Christian Catholic faith, Evangelical Christian faith and the Muslim faith. These 3 represent the 3 largest faiths (in each group about 1.300 prisoners).

In Hesse, we built a new network for deradicalisation in prisons, called "**NeDiS**", which is active since April 2016. "NeDiS" is a short form of "Netzwerk Deradikalisierung im Strafvollzug", that means "Network for De-Radicalisation in prisons". The network is based on 4 pillars:

- I. Identification of violent extremism,
- II. Prevention of radicalisation to violence,
- III. Promotion of disengagement and social reintegration and
- IV. Building a network for central coordination and communication
(including 8 structure observers in our bigger prisons and
1 Islamic scholar in our Ministry).

In my opinion, the creation of a coverage permanent pastoral offer - especially for Muslim prisoners - is as important as the security measures by NeDiS.

The positive experience with the christian spiritual welfare should encourage us to open pastoral offers to our muslim prisoners.

Of course, the use of religious care is voluntary, so that radicalized prisoners can escape it. But especially for the prisoners with long imprisonment, who are religiously radicalized or could it be, the possibility of participating in regular services (especially, but not only Friday prayers and individual or group discussions) is an interesting offer, at least in cases of real religious radicalisation. Even there, the chaplain (in this case: the Imam) comes to the prisoners and learns about a radicalisation or possible radicalisation risk significantly more than the prison staff persons, which prisoners usually trust less.

The mediation of religious values for Muslim prisoners by trained and reliable Imams comes to a resocialisation promoting effect when prisoners are strengthened not only in the knowledge of the contents of the Koran, but also in the development of its own personality.

Violent Islamism is often not only an extreme kind of worship, but also a movement of perceived or real socially disadvantaged and educationally disadvantaged populations. A stronger personality can resist better a polarizing agitation by violent extremists.

The caregivers should accompany the prisoners as possible throughout the whole period of their detention. It would be good not to lose the gained confidence by transfers to other prisons. If they like and it seems to be necessary, the prisoners should be accompanied even after release from prison.

Of course, it must be ensured that chaplains and especially Imams do not have extremist views themselves. And they should be fully educated Islamic scholars. They must confront the sympathizers and vulnerable prisoners in individual and group discussions - at least the group

discussions in our (German) language, not in the Arab, Turkish or another language! - with basic issues, such as:

- Which power potential has the religion?
- What about the relationship between religion and politics?
- How literally to understand the Koran?

By differentiated Koranic exegesis, confrontation with Islamic law, the prophets and the history of ideas of Islam there must be developed moderate answers (without violence) with and for the prisoners. The target is to counter glorifications of violence as Djihadi-Salafist or other extremist arguments. Then, religious instruction and worship make an important contribution to our security.

A 100% safety is impossible, neither in prisons nor outside the prisons. But we think that a widespread pastoral offer is one of the rewarding and indispensable means to minimize religious radicalisation for example by Salafists.

The positive experiences that we have so far with the Christian prisoners' pastoral care, we can fully utilize even with the religious support for Muslim prisoners in order not to become a violent extremist offender. Even if the "individual pastoral care" in Islam does not have a particular tradition, there is in the issue of pastoral care at the 3 monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) no significant difference.

Of course, the mobilization of the pastoral offer is voluntary. But the *selection* of imams we make ourselves and thus we increase the dynamic security.

We can not say how much acts of violence inside and outside the prisons were prevented by successful means of religious care. But if - while fulfilling the fundamental right to freedom of religion - even one single terrorist attack was prevented by it, it was worth it.

In Catalonia, our catalonian friends have partially similar ideas...

(Dr. Julio Zino)...

Thank you for your attention. ☺



Generalitat de Catalunya
Departament de Justícia
Directorate-General for Penitentiary Services

Europris' general basic rules on prison chaplaincy and de-radicalisation

The Catalan multi-faith chaplaincy approaches to deradicalisation

Julio Zino

Directorate-General for Penitentiary Services,
Department of Justice, Government of Catalonia

Preventing Radicalisation in Detention

Vienna, 12-13 October 2017

Vienna, Austria



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union 2014-2020

Personal professional background

:: My name is Julio Zino

:: I'm a Social Anthropologist

:: From 1987 to 2002 I worked as a Social Worker in prison

:: Since 2002, I have worked in the DGPS as head of a specialized Unit that deals with cultural diversity (immigrants and minorities), relations with different beliefs, ICT for inmates, gender equality...

:: Also, I'm a lecturer in Anthropology at University of Barcelona

The prison service in Catalonia

:: Catalonia is an autonomous community in Spain

:: Since 1984, the management of the prison system has been assigned to the Catalan administration

:: There are 9 closed prisons and 3 open prisons

:: Total of inmates in September 2017: 8579

:: Spanish: 56,7%

:: Foreigners: 43,3 % (UE: 7,4%)

Staff:

:: security staff : 3179

:: rehabilitation: 855

:: administration: 346



Centre Penitenciar Mas d'Enric

Terrorism in Catalonia

- In Spain, any terrorist action must be investigated by a central court in Madrid
- For this reason, in the Catalan prisons there are not a significant number of inmates convicted for terrorist crimes
- But Catalonia is an important area concerning the detection of radicalism → terrorist attacks in August 2017 are an emerging episode of the situation



Background actions related with cultural and religious diversity

:: Assignment of chaplains of different religions in prisons

:: Intercultural Mediation Service

:: Intercultural education programme

:: Interreligious dialogue groups

:: Training for professionals in different cultures, diversity of beliefs and radicalisation topics

:: “Guide for the respect of the diversity of beliefs”

Religious chaplaincy in prison

- :: 387 people of different religions are allowed to enter in prisons → chaplains and volunteers
- :: The Justice Department has signed agreements with Catholic, Evangelic and Muslim representatives to provide religious assistance in prisons (with funding)
- :: Designation of a member of prison's staff as interlocutor
- :: Procedures to facilitate the access of inmates to chaplains
- :: Regular coordination meetings with religious representatives

Awareness of the value of cultural and religious diversity (for the staff)


:: Training courses and workshops in different cultures, diversity of beliefs and radicalisation topics for professionals

:: Publication and dissemination of a "Guide for the respect of the diversity of beliefs in prisons"

:: Cooperation and exchange between confessions and chaplains

:: Open work session on the role of religions in rehabilitation

GUIA PER AL RESPECTE
A LA DIVERSITAT DE CREENCES
ALS CENTRES PENITENCIARIS
DE CATALUNYA



 Generalitat
de Catalunya

<http://goo.gl/ivm18F>

Awareness of the value of cultural and religious diversity for inmates

:: Activities to promote exchange and interrelation for inmates:

.: Intercultural Mediation Service → *particularities and common ground*

.: Intercultural Education Program → based in intercultural groups

.: Interreligious dialogue groups → with the support of an “*UNESCO Association*”

.: Ecumenical and interfaith meetings in prison → *prayer for peace*





Challenges on the topic of radicalisation

:: We are working on a **programme to prevent radicalisation** in prison

:: It has **two main axes**:

.: **detection** → coordination between security services outside and inside prisons

.: **prevention** → social, educational and psychological actions to deal with radicalisation

Prevention program (Arrel)

:: **Arrel** (root) → program to prevent radicalization processes of inmates at risk

:: Focused on all types of radicalisation

:: Transversal approach: integrated in the already existing offer of rehabilitation programs

:: This program has been elaborated with the participation of staff members from the young adults prison and from and adult's prison

Arrel (Root): Guidelines


:: Difficulty of predicting processes of radicalization → we work with the vulnerability and risk of inmates

:: Targeted actions aimed at three elements of the radicalization process

:: Reinforcement of preventive actions → 3 levels of prevention

Three elements of the radicalization process

vulnerable and influenced person



absence of
protective factors

extremist ideology
and radicalising influencer

Arrel (Root): Guidelines

- :: Dynamic detection → detection and evaluation of personal vulnerability and risk through continuous mentoring actions
- .: Mentoring actions are also a form of preventive intervention

- :: Offering alternative points of view and conflict narratives:
 - .: Intercultural Mediation Service
 - .: Intercultural education program
 - .: Interreligious dialogue groups

- :: Promote critical thinking

Thank you very much for your attention

Julio Zino

jzino@gencat.cat



Generalitat de Catalunya
Departament de Justícia



How Islamic religious services can contribute to preventing and countering religious radicalisation in prisons: the Dutch model and case studies



**Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the
European Union 2014-2020**



Some starting points /statements

- Islamic chaplaincy / religious counselling is primarily a care, aid and humanitarian assistance (like psychology, medical care and so on). It is a profession.
- Islamic chaplaincy is to assist detainees in giving concrete expression to their right to practice belief as stated in many conventions
- Preventing radicalisation should be seen as a by-catch, not as the main objective or target of IC. Instrumentalisation or 'securitarisation' of IC is less effective (at least for the long term).
- IC is part of the juridical system (prison service) and at the same time independent from it.
- The care consists of a coherent number of services and base on daily and close contact to the detainees.



Services IC

- Religious meetings (Friday prayer and sermon, other prayers in community)
- Individual (confidential) conversations
- Group conversations
- Special meetings and religious celebrations
- Interventions in crisis situations
- Presence (just to walk, small talks, saying salaam and how are you doing and so forth...)
- Counseling
- Mediation



Conditions posed by the Dutch State to institutionalise the Islamic Chaplaincy

in order to keep the status of official, to be equal to the established chaplains:

1. Recognition of a representative Muslim Organization which can take the responsibility for the theological suitability of the chaplains.
2. The appointment of a head of the Islamic Chaplaincy (nominated by the Muslim organization and delegated to act on behalf of the Muslim community).
3. The realisation of an Islamic academic theology course in order to make Muslim chaplains able to improve their education at academic level.



History of the Islamic Chaplaincy before 2008

- Until January 2008 Islamic Chaplains were not officials like their Christian, Jewish, and Humanist colleagues;
- First Muslim Chaplains were appointed as freelancers for just a very limited of hours a week;
- Freelance Muslim chaplains were appointed by the prison director. The established Chaplaincy (Catholic of Protestant) were responsible for t recruiting and screening the chaplains;
- Since 2004 the recruiting and screening of Muslim chaplains was done by the National Agency of Correctional institution, since 2006 by the director of the national agency of Chaplaincy, Spiritual Care Service (established in 2006)




Process of institutionalising IC

- On October 2007 the State recognized the CMO as the Sending Organization. A head of Islamic Chaplaincy was at the same time appointed.
- In 2005 the Vu University Amsterdam started the first Master Islamic spiritual care.
- Between October 2007 and January 2008:
 - The head formulated in cooperation with the the department of Spiritual Care and the Muslims Endorsing Organization the criteria of suitable Muslim Chaplains.
 - The criteria concerns the basic element of the 'Islamic clergy' (suitable imam for the context of public area) on the one hand and the fulfilling of an official on the other hand.
 - All chaplains had been tested on these criteria. new selection and screening had taken place.

Structure

**Denominational
sending organisations**

Ministry of Justice





Prison imams, The Netherlands



Swear ceremony









... Some prisoners actually become more serious about their religion precisely because they object to perceived slights against its value or integrity

James Beckford and Sophie Gilliat, *Religion in prison. Equal rites in a multi-faith society.*, 1998, p. 8-9.



Main foundations of chaplaincy /Spiritual care in the public domain

Article 18, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching’.



Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms uses almost the same phrasing in paragraphs 1 and 2:

'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance;

Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others'.



Causal Connection between Detention and Radicalisation

A. What factors may contribute to the religious radicalisation of Muslim detainees?

B. What is the role of *prison imams* in preventing and countering it?



Some factors which may contribute to the religious radicalisation of Muslim detainees and how Islamic chaplaincy dealt with it

- 1. Influence by prison imams who are themselves radical, who consciously or unconsciously spread radical thoughts.**
- 2. A lack of religious supervision of the detainees.**
- 3. Recruitment by other detainees.**
- 4. Religious reading material.**
- 5. Influence of external networks and communities.**